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I. INTRODUCTION 
When examined from the perspective of indigents, particularly 
those who are incarcerated prior to trial, the criminal justice system 
is not working well. Their experience in the system demonstrates 
that a gap exists between rules of law and actual practices. Proce­
dural protections supposedly guaranteed by the Federal Constitution 
and state statutes are not equally available because they carry a price 
that indigents are not able to pay. The legitimacy and credibility of 
the system is thus seriously eroded. Without the respect of those 
who come into contact with it, our criminal process is severely un­
dermined and rendered incapable of accomplishing its purpose. 1 
This article discusses some of the apparent inequities in the sys­
tem. Much of the impetus for the article was provided by several 
federal court cases in Indiana which challenged various aspects of 
• Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law. I.D., University of No­
tre Dame Law School, 1968. 
•• 1.0., Valparaiso University School of Law, 1976. 
••• Associate Professor of Law, Touro College School of Law. 1.0., Harvard 
Law School, 1966. 
1. While there are certainly exceptions, most persons will respect the system if they 
feel they were treated fairly and given a reasonable opportunity to fully present a 
defense. 
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the system. While the article is not intended as a commentary on 
these cases, the cases do provide a useful framework for analysis 
and, more important, supply much information relating to actual op­
eration of the system. Evidence presented in these cases reveals in­
formation not otherwise gathered and disseminated. One of the 
purposes of this article is to make this information known and to ask 
the serious questions raised by the information. For example, it was 
found that people were incarcerated for extensive periods by local 
police on mere suspicion prior to the filing of criminal charges and 
prolonged delays between arrest and initial court appearance were 
documented in several counties. A thorough study of the money­
based bail system, which keeps those without resources in jail prior 
to trial, shows that it causes not only a temporary loss of liberty but 
also has an adverse impact on the ultimate outcome of the criminal 
proceeding. Another study demonstrated a difference in case out­
come based on type of counsel, with those represented by court-ap­
pointed counsel obtaining less favorable results than those with 
private counsel. 
In examining the system from an indigent's perspective, the to­
tality of the circumstances becomes important to a full understand­
ing of the impact the criminal justice system has on such individuals. 
Therefore, we will review the process from the point of arrest until 
the time of trial. Although this process defies neat, concise categori­
zation, the discussion is divided into three areas: (1) the period be­
tween arrest and initial court appearance; (2) the role and impact of 
a money-based bail system; and (3) the significance of court-ap­
pointed counsel. The interrelationship between these aspects of the 
system will become obvious. For example, the inability to post bail 
results in detention prior to the initial court appearance. Delay in 
initial court appearance results in a delay in the appointment of 
counsel, and the lack of counsel makes it more difficult to obtain a 
bond reduction. A defect in anyone of these areas can have detri­
mental effects; because these defects are almost invariably combined, 
the result is intolerable. 
Some of the unlawful and inequitable procedures found in the 
criminal justice system are the product of long-standing tradition 
and official neglect. The needed changes can be made at the local 
level. Reform of practices prior to the initial court appearance re­
quires no change in legislation. Rather, it is a matter of enforcing 
existing law. With respect to bail and public defender practices, 
state statutory law, though not mandating the changes which will be 
recommended, does permit them. Despite the fact that change is 
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possible within the existing statutory scheme, few communities have 
implemented any meaningful reforms. This unwillingness to initiate 
reform is particularly troublesome when the costs of the existing sys­
tem are examined. Not only are human lives needlessly disrupted 
and fundamental rights violated, but present practices result in un­
necessary costs to taxpayers and are not effective in serving the 
states' legitimate interests. The needed changes would not only pro­
tect the constitutional and statutory rights of the indigent accused, 
but would also provide the community with as much or more protec­
tion at a lower cost to the taxpayers. Thus the system could be made 
more equitable without additional cost to the community. 
II. DELAY BETWEEN ARREST AND INITIAL COURT 





The period between arrest and initial court appearance can be 
most devastating. Even short-term incarceration can have disastrous 
consequences on the lives of arrestees. Family relationships are dis­
rupted, employment is threatened, and loss of job undermines the 
economic stability of families. In addition, pre-trial detention facili­
ties are notorious for overcrowding, poor living conditions and treat­
ment which infringe on basic human rights and dignity.2 Being 
incarcerated, the accused is also under the total control of the police/ 
prosecutorial branch of the criminal justice system; neither of the 
two "protective" branches of the system, namely, defense counsel 
and the impartial court, are even aware of the arrest. Important 
rights can be waived by the terrified, unknowing arrestee during this 
period and harmful statements to the police are not uncommon.3 
The availability of counsel can both guard against the waiver of le­
gal rights and alleviate some of the human concerns during this criti­
cal period. It will be shown, however, that counsel is often not 
appointed until much later.4 
A greater potential for abuse during the period between arrest 
2. See, e.g., Culbertson & Decker, Jails and Lockups in Indiana: A Case ofNeglect, 
49 IND. L.J. 253 (1974); Justice, Glendening & Wildey, Pilot Justice Project: A Survey of 
Six Indiana County Jails, 49 IND. L.J. 260 (1974). The plaintiffs in Dommer v. Hatcher, 
427 F.Supp. 1040 (N.D. Ind. 1975), rev'd in part sub nom., Dommer v. Crawford, 653 
F .2d. 289 (7th Cir. 1981), discussed infra text accompanying notes 20-23, also challenged 
conditions and treatment at the jail. 
3. COURTS, Standard 13.1 commentary 254 (National Advisory Commission on 
Criminal Justice Standards and Goals 1973). 
4. See infra notes 115-16 and accompanying text. 
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and initial court appearance exists in cases in which the arrest is 
made without a warrant and thus without any judicial sanction. 
While warrantless arrests are appropriate in some circumstances,s 
the police must nonetheless have probable cause6 at the time of the 
arrest to believe. that the person has committed a crime. The 
Supreme Court in Gerstein v. Pugh 7 held that police judgment relat­
ing to probable cause must be promptly reviewed by a judicial of­
ficer.s The procedures challenged there allowed persons arrested 
without a warrant to be jailed pending trial without any opportunity 
5. The Supreme Court has expressed a preference for the use of arrest warrants 
when feasible, however, "it has never invalidated an arrest supported by probable cause 
solely because the officers failed to secure a warrant." Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 
113 (1975) (citations omitted). The allowance of arrests without a warrant "represents a 
necessary accommodation between the individual's right to liberty and the State's duty to 
control crime." /d. at 112. The Court recognizes that "[m]aximum protection ofindivid­
ual rights could be assured by requiring a magistrate's review of the factual justification 
prior to any arrest, but such a requirement would constitute an intolerable handicap for 
legitimate law enforcement." la. at 113. 
6. Because the fourth amendment protects against "unfounded invasions of liberty 
and privacy," la. at ll2, the standard for arrest has been set at "probable cause." la. 
This has been defined in terms of facts and circumstances "sufficient to warrant a pru­
dent man in believing that the [suspect] had committed or was committing an offense." 
Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964). This standard allows for mistakes on the part of the 
police as long as the mistakes are those of reasonable persons. It does not permit a 
police officer to arrest a person based on suspicion, hunch, or "for investigation." Rather, 
Objective and substantial evidence is necessary to justify such a "seizure." See Brinegar 
v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 177 (1949) (officer's "whim, caprice or mere suspicion" 
insufficient). 
The probable cause standard has existed for many years, see, e.g., Albrecht v. 
United States, 273 U.S. 1,5 (1927), and has withstood various efforts by its opponents to 
allow the police to make arrests on a less stringent standard. A proposed Uniform Arrest 
Act, adopted by three states, authorizes short-term detention on less than probable cause. 
Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 VA. L. REv. 315 (1942). As demonstrated by Ger­
stein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975), and the cases cited therein, the Supreme Court has 
steadfastly maintained the probable cause standard. la. at 112. 
7. 420 U.S. 103 (1975). 
8. In order to minimize the effects of police mistakes, "the Court has required that 
the existence of probable cause be decided by a neutral and detached magistrate when­
ever possible." 420 U.S. at 112. The basis for this has been described as follows: 
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zeal­
ous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual infer­
ences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in 
requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate 
instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enter­
prise of ferreting out crime. 
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948). As a compromise, in some situations 
police are allowed to exercise their discretion on the spot and make arrests without a 
judicial review of the factual circumstances; however, a prompt subsequent review by a 
judicial officer is required. This compromise was recently described by the Supreme 
Court as follows: 
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for a probable cause determination by a judicial officer.9 The prose­
cutor in Gerstein contended that his decision to file an information 
was a sufficient determination of probable cause. The Court, how­
ever, concluded that the "prosecutorial judgment standing alone 
[does not meet] the requirements of the Fourth Amendment."10 In 
reaching this conclusion, the Court stressed the need for an assess­
ment of probable cause by someone independent of police and 
prosecution. I I 
The critical holding of Gerstein is that "the Fourth Amendment 
requires a timely judicial determination of probable cause as a pre­
requisite to detention."12 While Gerstein provides a constitutional 
Under this practical compromise, a policeman's on-the-scene assessment of 
probable cause provides legal justification for arresting a person suspected of 
crime, and for a brief period of detention to take the administrative steps inci­
dent to arrest. Once the suspect is in custody, however, the reasons that justify 
dispensing with the magistrate's neutral judgment evaporate. There no longer 
is any danger that the suspect will escape or commit further crimes while the 
police submit their evidence to a magistrate. And, while the State's reasons for 
taking summary action subside, the suspect's need for a neutral determination 
of probable cause increases significantly. The consequences of prolonged de­
tention may be more serious than the interference occasioned by arrest. Pretrial 
confinement may imperil the suspect's job, interrupt his source of income, and 
impair his family relationships. . . . Even pretrial release may be accompanied 
by burdensome conditions that effect a significant restraint of liberty.... 
When the stakes are this high, the detached judgment of a neutral magistrate is 
essential if the Fourth Amendment is to furnish meaningful protection from 
unfounded interference with liberty .... Accordingly, we hold that the Fourth 
Amendment requires a judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequi­
site to extended restraint of liberty following arrest. 
Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 113-14 (citations omitted). 
9. In contrast, a person arrested pursuant to a warrant would have received a prior 
judicial determination of probable cause. 
10. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 117. 
II. Id. at 118. See also United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 
297,316-17 (1972); Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345 (1972); Coolidge v. New 
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 449-53 (1971); Albrecht v. United States, 273 U.S. 1,5 (1927). 
12. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 126. It did not, however, require that the determination 
be made in an adversary context. Rather, the Court indicated that the fourth amend­
ment protection could be provided in a variety of ways. 
There is no single preferred pretrial procedure, and the nature of the probable 
cause determination usually will be shaped to accord with a State's pretrial pro­
cedure viewed as a whole. While we limit our holding to the precise require­
ment of the Fourth Amendment, we recognize the desirability of flexibility and 
experimentation by the States. It may be found desirable, for example, to make 
the probable cause determination at the suspect's first appearance before a judi­
cial officer,. . . or the determination may be incorporated into the procedure 
for setting bail or fixing other conditions of pretrial release. In some States, 
existing procedures may satisfy the requirement of the Fourth Amendment. 
Others may require only minor adjustment, such as acceleration of existing pre­
liminary hearings. . . . Whatever procedure a State may adopt, it must pro­
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basis for requiring a prompt judicial determination of probable 
cause, federal law has long required that arrested persons be brought 
before a magistrate without unnecessary delay.13 This requirement 
has not unduly interfered with the processing of criminal cases in the 
federal courts. 
The Gerstein requirement of prompt judicial determinations of 
probable cause can easily be accommodated under existing proce­
dures. Indiana law allows police to make warrantless arrests, but the 
legislature, similar to many other states,14 has also mandated early 
judicial determinations of probable cause. One statute requires that 
a person arrested without a warrant be brought before a court within 
twenty-four hours in most situations. IS Other provisions, not quite as 
vide a fair and reliable determination of probable cause as a condition for any 
significant pretrial constraint of liberty, and this determination must be made 
by a judicial officer either before or promptly after arrest. 
Id. 	at 123-25. 
13. In McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943), and Mallory v. United 
States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957), the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its judicial supervision 
of the federal criminal justice system, prohibited the use of evidence obtained during 
lengthy delays between the arrest of suspects and their initial appearance before a magis­
trate. The decisions were based on Rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
which provides: 
An officer making an arrest under a warrant issued upon a complaint or 
any person making an arrest without a warrant shall take the arrested person 
without unnecessary delay before the nearest available federal magistr:ate or, in 
the event that a federal magistrate is not reasonably available, before a state or 
local judicial officer authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 3041 [(1982»). 
14. At least forty-one states and territories have statutes requiring that arrested 
persons be promptly brought before a magistrate. See MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAiGN­
MENT PROCEDURE 256-57 app. I (Tent. Draft No.6, 1974). These statutes typically pro­
vide that the appearance shall be "immediately," "without unnecessary delay," "with 
reasonable promptness" or within a set time period. Id. Both these statutes and the 
constitutional holding in Gerstein reflect long-standing practice. 
At common law it was customary, ifnot obligatory, for an arrested person to be 
brought before a justice of the peace shortly after arrest. 2 M. Hale, Pleas of the 
Crown 77,81,95,121 (1736); 2 W. Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown 116-17 (4th ed. 
1762). See also Kurtz v. Moffitt, 115 U.S. 487, 498-499 (1885). The justice of 
the peace would "examine" the prisoner and the witnesses to determine 
whether there was reason to believe the prisoner had committed a crime. . . . 
This practice furnished the model for criminal procedure in America immedi­
ately following the adoption of the Fourth Amendment,... and there are indi­
cations that the Framers of the Bill of Rights regarded it as a model for a 
"reasonable" seizure. See Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. at 317-320 (Doug­
las, J., dissenting). 
Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 114-16 (footnotes omitted). 
15. 	 IND. CODE ANN. § 36-8-3-11 (Burns 1981) provides: 
Whenever an arrest has been made by a police officer, the officer making 
the arrest shall bring the person arrested before the court having jurisdiction of 
the offense, to be dealt with according to law. If the arrest is made during the 
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specific, also require an early appearance before a judicial officer. 16 
These provisions illustrate a legislative intent to insure that all war­
rantless arrests be reviewed promptly by a judicial officer. If the ju­
dicial officer finds probable cause for the arrest, then detention or 
conditioned release is appropriate. If probable cause is not found, 
immediate release is mandatory. 
In Indiana, moreover, the purpose of the initial appearance 
before a judicial officer is not limited to a probable cause determina­
tion. The Indiana Supreme Court has articulated four purposes of 
this appearance: 
(1) Advise the arrestee of the charges against him; (2) Advise the 
arrestee of his constitutional rights; (3) Provide arrestee with an 
attorney if arrestee was without funds to hire one; (4) Determine 
whether there is sufficient evidence that the crime charged has 
been committed and the accused committed it. 17 
Thus, the prompt appearance required by Gerstein can easily be ac­
commodated within the statutory scheme as interpreted by the Indi­
ana Supreme Court. 
Against this background, it is instructive to examine practices 
uncovered in several Indiana counties. While it is not suggested that 
the abuses found in these counties exist throughout the nation, they 
may be far too representative. 18 At a minimum, they demonstrate 
hours when court is not in session, or if the judge is not holding court, the 
person shall be detained in jail until there is an opportunity for a hearing at the 
earliest practicable time or until he is released on bail. But a person may not be 
detained longer than twenty-four (24) hours except when Sunday intervenes, in 
which case a person may not be detained longer than forty-eight (48) hours. 
In Grooms v. Fervida, 396 N.E.2d. 405, 411 (Ind. 1979), it was held that this section, 
formerly IND. CODE § 18-1-11-8 (1978), applies only to city and town police, and not 
county police. 
16. See generally, IND. CODE ANN. § 35-33-7-1-7 (Bums Supp. 1983). 
17. Nacoffv. State, 256 Ind. 97,102, 267 N.E.2d 165, 168 (1971). More recently, in 
Williams v. State, 264 Ind. 664, 348 N.E.2d. 623 (1976), the Indiana Supreme Court cited 
Nacojf in stating that "[d]etention beyond a reasonable period necessary to bring a sus­
pect before a magistrate is illegal,"ld at 671,348 N.E.2d at 629, and Gerstein in recogniz­
ing the importance of "protecting citizens from illegal procedures which insulate arrested 
persons from judicial safeguards." 
18. The statistics compiled through discovery in. the two cases discussed below, 
infra text accompanying notes 20-28, are unique in that they represent some of the few 
instances in which these abuses have been documented with such detail. Police depart­
ments and court personnel do not keep records of illegal arrests and delays in presenting 
arrestees to the court. Despite the lack of hard statistics, observers have long suspected 
that these illegal practices are common. See, e.g. , Foote, Safeguards in the Law ofArrest, 
42 Nw. U. L. REV. 16,20-27 (1952); LAFAVE, ARREST 437-82 (1965). A generation ago 
unconstitutional arrests were estimated to number several million per year. Hall, Police 
and Law in a Democratic Society, 28 IND. L.J. 133, 152-54 (1953). 
270 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:263 
the need for law enforcement officials in all communities to scruti­
nize closely their practices. 
One of the most serious abuses by law enforcement officials19 
was found in Lake County, Indiana, and it led to the far-reaching 
opinion of Judge Sharp in Dommer v. Halcher.20 The Gary, Indiana 
police department had developed a practice of jailing persons on 
"suspicion" and holding them while investigations were conducted 
to establish probable cause. Numerous persons were jailed under 
this practice-often for extended periods-bifore they were charged 
with a specific crime. As a result, neither a determination of prob­
able cause by a judicial officer nor the opportunity for release 
through bail was available. The Dommer case challenged both the 
holding on "suspicion" and the delay in initial court appearance.21 
Because anyone with access to counsel would quickly be freed 
through a habeas corpus petition or the threat of a petition, it was 
not surprising that most of the persons detained in accordance with 
this practice were indigent and without legal counsel. 
Referring to this "extensive abuse of plaintiffs' rights," the dis­
trict court in Dommer observed: 
[I]n the one-year period from March, 1973, through March, 
1974, defendants have admitted holding thirty-one (31) individu­
als, twelve (12) of whom were never charged, but were held in jail 
an average of... eleven and four tenth (11.4) days before being 
released. The remaining nineteen (19) individuals were held an 
average of... [8.1] days before being charged with an offense. 
Defendants have also admitted that during the four month period 
from May, 1974, through August 26, 1974, thirty-seven (37) indi­
viduals were held, fifteen (15) of which were never charged, but 
were incarcerated an average of six and eight tenth (6.8) days 
19. Rather than attempt to allocate blame between the police, prosecutors and 
judges, we will simply include all of them as law enforcement officials with some respon­
sibility to guard against the abuses discussed here. 
20. 427 F Supp. 1040 (N.D. Ind. 1975), rev'd in part sub. nom., Dommer v. Craw­
ford, 653 F.2d. 289 (7th Cir. 1981). The Seventh Circuit reversed the lower court only 
insofar as the relief included the prosecutor who had not been in office when the facts 
arose. Otherwise, the relief was affirmed. 
21. There are two possible points of delay between arrest and initial court appear­
ance: one between the arrest and filing of a criminal charge and the other between the 
filing of a criminal charge and the actual court appearance. Extensive delay at either of 
these points is contrary to both Indiana statutes and the United States Constitution. 
Wherever the delay and whatever the cause, it results in the indigent accused being con­
fined in what is often a less-than-decent facility, isolated from the detached, impartial 
officer ultimately responsible for the fairness of the system, the judge. This situation 
exists despite the fact that the accused is presumed to be innocent at this point. 
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before being released. The remaining twenty-four (24) were held 
an average of five (5) days before being charged.22 
While this information is alarming, the court's opinion understated 
the full breadth of the problem. Discovery obtained through war­
rant records and daily jail logs indicates that during February, 1974 
at least 158 of 370 inmates (43%) were held for three days or longer 
without being charged. The records also reveal that February was 
fairly typical. A sampling of 106 cases of persons jailed for more 
than three days between March, 1973 and August, 1974 demon­
strates that people were being held up to twenty-five days without 
charge and that incarceration from four to ten days was not at all 
uncommon.23 
A greater abuse of the police power can hardly be imagined, 
and it is tragic that the practice was allowed to continue as long as it 
did. While the system provided a prompt remedy for those with 
counsel (who could quickly file a writ of habeas corpus), this was not 
feasible for indigents without counsel. No one knows how many 
persons lost jobs or suffered other serious consequences as a result of 
the illegal detention. Also unknown is the number of persons who 
were eventually released without being charged, or, if charged, were 
22. 427 F. Supp. at 1041-42. 
23. See generally, Requests for Admissions filed in Dommer on Apr. 17, 1974, and 
Sept. 26, 1974, and response filed Oct. 24, 1974. Some of this can be graphically 
illustrated: 
A. Percentage ofInmates Heldfor Investigation More than J Days Without Charges. 
100% 
80% 
60% / ~ 
V
'----- ~ .--------­40% ---- ~ 
20% 
Date Apr. I May I June I July I Aug. I Sept. I Oct. I Nov. I Jan. I 
1973 1973 1973 1973 1973 1973 1973 1973 1974 




(53%) (41%) (54%) (76%) (42%) (62%) (67%) (38%) (54%) 
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eventually acquitted or had the charges dismissed. 
Another type of abuse, perhaps more prevalent throughout the 
state,24 was found in Delaware County, Indiana, where arrestees, 
though promptly charged, were not promptly brought before a judi­
cialofficer. The plaintiff in Fox v. Jordan 25 was arrested on Septem­
ber 27, 1978 and not brought before a court for his arraignment until 
more than seven days had passed. Because of his indigency, he was 
able neither to post the set bail nor obtain counsel to seek his release 
from jail. When Fox was finally brought before a judicial officer on 
October 5, 1978, he pleaded not guilty and was released on his own 
recognizance. In the interim, Fox lost his job.26 
Discovery in the Fox case reveals that during the months of Au­
gust to October, 1978, approximately seventy-five percent of the per­
sons arrested and held in the Delaware County Jail were not brought 
before a judicial officer within twenty-four hours of their arrests, 
contrary to Indiana law. Over half of the persons arrested waited 
more than two days for their initial court appearance. Several 
B. 	 Number ofDays Held Without Charges-106 Inmates Jailed Between March, 1973, 
and August, 1974: 
13 
12 /\ 1\ 
I \ I \ ;1




0/ 8 I 
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J 	 \ 
I4 
5 	
-" ,1 	 \3 J I"'.2 
1 II \ /\ ~ 
~j VV V 
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 
Number ofDays Held Without Charges 
It should be noted that juveniles and persons with mental health problems were included 
among those being held. 
24. American University Criminal Courts Technical Assistance Project, The Struc­
ture and Funding/or Criminal Defense of Indigents in Indiana 24 (1974). This survey 
noted that in some Indiana counties the initial appearance in court may be delayed a 
week. Often this results from the practice of scheduling only one arraignment day per 
week. 
25. No. IP 78-643-C (S.D. Ind., filed Oct. 5, 1978). 
26. Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, Attachment A, Fox (dated June 
14,1979). 
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waited a full week.27 Most of these persons were victims of a prac­
tice which limited arraignments to one day per week in non-traffic 
cases28 and therefore the length of one's detention depended solely 
on the day of arrest. Again, the role of counsel is crucial at this stage 
because counsel could likely get an appearance before a judge, at 
least for purposes of considering a bail reduction. Absent counsel, 
the detained person must simply wait until the next day for a court 
appearance. 
One would like to think that the practices documented in Dom­
mer and Fox are isolated. However, there is no reason to assume 
that those situations are atypical and have been corrected. An even 
more recent example was found in Kokomo, Howard 
County, Indiana. The practice there combined the worst aspects of 
the practices in Lake and Delaware Counties. When an arrest was 
made without a warrant, the arrestee would wait in jail up to several 
days while the arresting officer prepared a written report for the 
prosecutor. After the prosecutor received the report there would be 
another delay until a charge was filed and the court issued a warrant 
indicating the amount of bail. 
Another day or two often passed before the warrant was served 
on the detained arrestee. If the arrestee could post the bond at that 
time, he would be released and given an arraignment date. But if the 
arrestee could not post bond, there would be an additional delay un­
til the first court appearance because there was no formal procedure 
for scheduling. arraignment of incarcerated persons. When finally 
brought before the court for arraignment-the arrestee's first court 
appearance-rounsel would normally be appointed and the arraign­
27. Id. Attachments B-1 and B-2. This data can be graphically illustrated also: 
Number of Persons Held in Delaware County Jail for Various Periods of Time ­
August - October, 







10 	 144-168 
3 16~192 
2 192-216 ---=---­
184 	 Total 
28. Deposition of defendant prosecutor, Jordan, at 36. This is similar to, but worse 
than, the practice noted by the Indiana Court of Appeals in Grooms v. Fervida, 396 
N.E.2d at 408. 
274 WESTERN NEW ENGLANlJ LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:263 
ment would be postponed further.29 
A good example of the impact of the Howard County practices 
is found in the case of an individual arrested for shoplifting in late 
November, 1980. The person was incarcerated in the county jail for 
fifteen days until charges were filed and did not appear in court until 
the twenty-third day after his arrest, at which time he was tried and 
acquitted. It is not known how much longer the delay would have 
been had the person's sister not appeared at the courthouse on the 
fifteenth day after his arrest to inquire about his status. At that time 
she was referred to an attorney who was in court on other matters 
and he was able to intervene and have the case set for prompt trial,30 
The fact that these situations have continued to exist demon­
strates the urgent need for law enforcement officials and courts to 
examine closely the procedures between arrest and initial court ap­
pearance, at least when the arrest is made without a warrant. Even if 
officials are not particularly concerned about the constitutional 
rights of the persons arrested, such a review should be conducted 
because of the expense of pre-trial detention3l and because illegal 
detention can subject the responsible officials to damage actions.32 
The evils of delays in appearance before a judicial officer are partic­
ularly acute for those incarcerated during the interim and, not sur­
prisingly, there is reason to suggest that the illegal practices 
described here are concentrated in the poor and minority communi­
ties.33 With few exceptions, persons incarcerated prior to the initial 
court appearance are those without the resources necessary to obtain 
their freedom. 
III. PRE-TRIAL DETENTION-THE INEQUITIES OF A SYSTEM 

WHICH CONDITIONS RELEASE ALMOST SOLEY ON 

ABILITY TO PAY 

Intertwined with the aspect of the system described above and 
29. Interview with Dan J. May, Kokomo attomey(December 1980). Mr. May has 
practiced criminal law in Howard County for several years. 
30. Id. The practice in Howard County was apparently corrected in January, 
1981. An article in a local newspaper reported that as of January 19, 1981 a judge would 
be available each morning to review arrests made without a warrant, determine prob­
able cause, set bail, and advise the persons arrested of their rights. Kokomo Tribune, 
Jan. 18, 1981, at 1. 
31. See infra note 65 and accompanying text. 
32. See, e.g., Grooms v. Fervida, 396 N.E.2d 405,411 (Ind. 1979). 
33. See, e.g. , PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMIN­
ISTRATION OF JUSTICE: TASK FORCE REPORT- THE POLICE 178-89 (1967); Note, Phila­
delphia Police Practice and the Law ofArrest, 100 U. PA. L. REv. 1182 (1952). 
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extending through trial is the impact of the money-based bail sys­
tem. Most of the human and legal concerns expressed above disap­
pear if the accused is released promptly after arrest. Such early 
release is available, almost without exception, to those who have the 
financial resources to purchase their freedom. Release on some form 
of bail presumes, of course, that a criminal charge has been at least 
tentatively identified.34 Since persons charged with criminal offenses 
are presumed innocent until the state proves otherwise, the state's 
sole interest in detaining them prior to trial is to assure that they will 
appear in court when required.35 This means that persons arrested 
should be released pending trial unless there is some reason to be­
lieve they will not make court appearances. 
The historical and, in many states, the current means of preserv­
ing the presumption of innocence while also serving the state's inter­
est in assuring court appearances has been to require the posting of 
monetary bail.36 This is normally done by executing a bond with an 
insurance company providing the surety. Generally, a premium of 
ten percent of the total bail is paid to a surety bondsman who makes 
a commitment to either produce the accused in court when sched­
uled or forfeit the total amount of the bail. As this ten percent pre­
mium is not returned to the accused, regardless of whether court 
appearances are made, there is little financial incentive for the de­
fendant to appear. 
There is no better example of the inequities of money bail than 
the situation presented to the federal court in the case of Mudd v. 
Busse.37 This class action, brought by two individuals incarcerated 
in the Allen County jail in Fort Wayne, Indiana, sought to reform 
the bail practices of the Allen Circuit Court which relied almost ex­
clusively on money bail and where the initial amount of bail was 
based on a master bond schedule. Because the Allen Superior Court 
had implemented a bail project which provided for release on one's 
34. The situation described in Dommer was particularly offensive because people 
were being held on mere suspicion without the identification of a criminal charge. 
Therefore the opportunity to post bail was not even available until the police investiga­
tion was completed and a charge filed. 
35. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. I (1951); Duran v. Elrod, 542 F.2d 998 (7th Cir. 1976); 
Hobbs v. Lindsey, 240 Ind. 74, 162 N.E.2d 85 (1959). Preventive detention may fre­
quently be the real, but unarticulated, reason for pre-trial incarceration. See infro notes 
67, 79 and accompanying text. 
36. The right to bail is found in the eighth amendment to the U.S. Constitution 
and Art. I, Section 17 of the Indiana Constitution. Indiana law, IND. CODE ANN. § 35­
33-8-3(1)(Burns Supp. 1983) expressly provides for the use of a surety. 
37. 68 F.R.D. 522 (N.D. Ind. 1975),437 F. Supp. 505 (N.D. Ind. 1977), q/f'd, 582 
F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 43.9 U.S. 1078 (1979). 
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own recognizance or non-monetary conditions, the availability of 
pre-trial release in Allen County often depended upon the court se­
lected by the state. Under the local practice, the prosecuting attor­
ney had the unfettered discretion to choose between these two courts. 
The named plaintiffs in Mudd graphically illustrate the inequity and 
arbitrariness of the system. 
Both plaintiffs had been arrested in late November, 1974, on 
preliminary charges of burglary which were filed in the superior 
court. After officials of the bail project conducted their normal in­
quiry, both were released without being required to post any mone­
tary bai1. One of them had been similarly released by the project on 
an earlier charge, and both made their scheduled court appearances. 
In early December, the prosecutor filed the formal charges for the 
same burglary against the two plaintiffs in the circuit court which 
refused to participate in the bail project. Bond was set at $5,000, the 
amount prescribed by the master bond schedule.38 As a result, there 
was no individual determination as to whether a $5,000 bond, or any 
bond, was necessary to assure their appearance in court. Their prior 
history of making court appearances was not considered. Because of 
their indigency, neither plaintiff was able to obtain his release from 
jail at that time.39 
This led to the initiation of the federal court action in which the 
plaintiffs argued that the Constitution, because of the presumption of 
innocence and the deprivation of their fundamental right to free­
dom, required the courts to use the least restrictive means available 
to assure that the accused will appear in court as scheduled. In any 
case, the least restrictive condition would obviously be an outright 
release based on the accused's promise to appear in court. There­
fore, it was argued that other non-monetary conditions could be im­
posed only if the state demonstrated that an outright release would 
not be· sufficient to assure appearance. Examples of such conditions 
would include reporting to an officer of the court, restrictions on 
leaving the county, maintenance of employment, and deposit of a 
refundable ten percent of the bond with the court.40 Only in extreme 
cases might money bail be justified.41 
38. 437 F. Supp. at 508. 
39. See generally, Pre-Trial Order, Mudd (filed April 4, 1977). 
40. See the Federal Bail Reform Act of 1966, 18 U.S.c. § 3146(a)(1982), and IND. 
COD ANN. § 35-33-8-3 (Bums Supp. 1983) for an indication of other non-monetary con­
ditions available. 
41. The Mudd case was never decided on the merits because, after certifying a 
class, the federal court determined that principles of federalism and comity prevented it 
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As part of the preparation of the plaintiffs case in Mudd, an 
extensive study42 was made of the bail system as it operated in Allen 
County to determine how it affected indigent persons accused of a 
crime. The study examined 411 closed criminal felony cases filed in 
the circuit court during 1974 and 1975. Its primary purpose was to 
determine whether pre-trial detention affected the outcome in crimi­
nal cases. Most significantly, the study confirmed what was already 
generally believed: that pre-trial detention adversely affected the 
outcome of a criminal case. Those detained prior to trial were more 
likely to be convicted and much more likely to be sentenced to 
prison than those released prior to trial. 43 
The evidence showed that persons charged in the circuit court 
and detained prior to trial were convicted fifteen percent more often 
and sentenced to prison sixty percent more often than those who 
were released on bail immediately upon arrest.44 In other words, 
seven out of ten persons detained prior to trial received a prison term 
compared to only one out of ten persons released upon arrest. This 
unfavorable relationship between pre-trial incarceration and ulti­
mate outcome was tested by examining other variables that might 
explain the observed disparity. These included the type of crime 
charged, prior criminal record of the accused, type of counsel, race, 
and amount of final bail imposed.45 None of the factors, considered 
individually and collectively, explained the disparity in outcome be­
tween those detained and those released prior to trial. Consistently, 
from becoming involved in the issue. 437 F. Supp. at 510-13. This determination to 
avoid the merits was made, however, only after the conclusion of discovery and the mat­
ter had been submitted to the court for a ruling on the merits of cross-motions for sum­
mary judgment. 
42. See infra Appendix A. 
43. See, e.g. , Ares, Rankin & Sturz, The Manhattan Bail Project: An Interim Report 
on the Use ofPretrial Parole, 38 N.Y. U.L. REv. 67 (1963); Wald, Pretrial Dentention and 
Ultimate Freedom: A Statistical Study, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 631, 633 (1964); Wilson, New 
Approaches to Pretrial Detention, 39 KAN. BAR ASS'N 13, IS (1970); Note, An Answer to 
the Problem ofBail' A Proposal in Need ofEmpirical Confirmation, 9 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. 
PROB. 394,402-03 (1973); Note,A Study ofthe Administration ofBail in New York City, 
106 U. PA. L. REv. 693, 726-27 (1958); Note, Compelling Appearance in Court: Adminis­
tration ofBail in Philadelphia, 102 U. PA. L. REV. 1031, 1051-54 (1954); Ervin, Preventive 
Detention-A Step Backward for Criminal Justice, 6 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 291, 347 
(1971). 
44. See infra Appendix A at 309-10. 
45. This process, known as elaboration, tests an observed relationship between two 
primary variables by examining other variables that might be responsible for the rela­
tionship. Thus, if the relationship between the primary variables disappears when the 
third variable is held constant, it is said to "explain" the relationship. However, if the 
relationship between the primary variables still holds when the third variable is intro­
duced, then the new variable does not explain the relationship. If no variable can be 
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detained arrestee's were convicted more often and sentenced much 
more severely than those who were released. This strongly suggests 
that there is a causal relationship between pre-trial detention and 
outcome in criminal cases.46 
The causal relationship found in the study is not unique to Al­
len County, Indiana. In fact it is one of the defects listed by Profes­
sor Zeisel in his criticism of money bail. 
The American bail system has been under serious criticism 
on a variety of grounds. It has been charged with three specific 
failures, all of which discriminate against the indigent defendant 
found to explain the relationship between the primary variables, it can be concluded that 
the relationship is causal. 
In this study, the elaboration analysis examines the apparent correlation between 
pretrial status and outcome (the "independent" and "dependent" variables respectively) 
by investigating other factors, such as prior criminal record, type of counsel, etc. (the 
"test" variables), that might be responsible for this relationship. First, the relation be­
tween a particular factor (e.g., type of crime) and pretrial status is examined; next, the 
relationship between that factor and outcome is examined. According to the logic of 
elaboration, if there is no significant correlation between the factor examined and pretrial 
status and/or outcome (e.g. , if type of crime does not make detention or conviction more 
likely), then that factor cannot explain the relationship between pretrial status and out­
come. If, however, there is a positive correlation between the factor and both pretrial 
status and outcome (e.g., if type of crime makes detention and conviction more likely), 
that factor may explain the relationship. 
To test whether this factor (type of crime) or any of the other test variables account 
for the relationship between pretrial status and outcome, that factor must be held con­
stant and the relationship between status and outcome must be reexamined. If the dis­
parity in outcome between the detained and the released no longer exists when this is 
done (e.g. , if persons accused of robbery have the same conviction rate whether they are 
detained or released), then that factor explains the relationship, and pretrial status is 
shown not to have had a causal impact on outcome. On the other hand, if the disparity 
persists when the factor under examination is held constant, then the factor does not 
explain the relationship. This process is repeated with all relevant factors and, if none is 
found which explains the relationship between pretrial status and outcome, then the rela­
tionship is causal. This study examines such factors, one by one, and also in combina­
tion. See infra Appendix A at 310-22. 
46. The authors realize that the statistical methods utilized here might have been 
supplemented with other methods, e.g. , a multivariate analysis. It is not our goal, how­
ever, to prove to a legal certainty through statistics that there are defects in the system. 
Rather, we are attempting to call attention to certain aspects of the system which need 
closer scrutiny at the official level. The evidence does demand a serious consideration of 
certain reforms. 
The present study and its results are similar to the one conducted in New York City 
about the effects of bail. Dr. Eric Single was responsible for both studies. See Single, 
The Unconstitutional Administration ofBail' Bellamy II. Judges ofNew York City, 8 CRIM. 
L. BULL. 459 (1972). A methodological critique of that study is contained in Hindelang, 
On the Methodological Rigor ofthe Bellamy Memorandum, 8 CRIM. L. BULL. 507 (1972). 
After noting a number of statistical shortcomings, the critique concludes that the evi­
dence is "persuasive that making bail is a factor important to outcome." Id. at 513. 
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who cannot make bail: (1) that it keeps in jail defendants who 
would have returned to court if they had been released, some of 
whom are not even convicted; (2) that it releases defendants who 
should not have been released; (3) that the very fact of pre-trial 
detention increases the likelihood that defendants will be con­
victed and, if convicted, will receive a custody sentence.47 
Professor Zeisel termed the relationship between pre-trial incarcera­
tion and conviction and sentencing, "the most serious congenital de­
fect of the system."48 Another comprehensive study found that "the 
convicted person who had been held in lieu of bail had a 25 percent 
greater chance of getting a prison sentence than the convicted person 
who made bail."49 
The correlation between pre-trial incarceration and increased 
conviction and sentencing rates is not surprising at all. As Professor 
Zeisel points out: 
If a defendant at the time of sentencing has spent some time 
in jail, the court will be tempted to make the time served "legal" 
by imposing a jail sentence rather than allowing a "walk" sentence 
that may raise doubts about the merits of the earlier imposed pre­
trial detention. 50 
There are other obvious reasons for this correlation. Not only is the 
victim of pre-trial detention of little value to his counsel in the prep­
aration of the defense, the pre-trial detainee is also subject to con­
stant pressure to plead guilty. After several months of pre-trial 
detention, even innocent persons enter a plea of guilty rather than 
remain in jail indefinitely awaiting trial.5 1 In addition, the person 
incarcerated prior to trial and sentencing has not had an opportunity 
to develop a favorable record, maintenance of employment and fam­
47. Zeisel, Bail Revisited, AM. B. FOUND.J. 769, 769 (1979). 
48. Id. at 779. 
49. HERMAN, SINGLE, BOSTON, COUNSEL FOR THE POOR 62 (1977). 

SO. Zeisel, supra note 47, at 781. 

S1. Zeisel, supra note 47, at 78S-87; Barkai, Accuracy Inquiries for All Felony and 

Misdemeanor Pleas: Voluntary Pleas But Innocent Defendants? 126 PA. L. REv. 88,97, 
(1977); Finkelstein, A Statistical Analysis ofGuilty Plea Practices in the Federal Courts, 89 
HARV. L. REV. 293, 307-12 (197S); White, A Proposal/or Reform o/the Plea Bargaining 
Process, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 439, 443-4S (1971). As to the impact of this factor in attack­
ing a guilty plea, compare United States v. Barrett, SI4 F.2d 1241, 1242 (Sth Cir. 
1975)Gail conditions prior to plea constituting cruel and unusual punishment did not 
authorize vacating sentence and, in view of the artful pleadings, contention of coercion 
could not be heard), with Pettyjohn v. United States, 419 F.2d 6SI, 662 (D.C. Cir. 1969) 
(if the court is to uphold bargained pleas, it must also delineate the power and duty of the 
trial court to conduct a further inquiry), cert. denied, 397 U.S. lOS8 (1970). Conditions in 
jails certainly provide some pressure to plea bargain. See supra note 2. 
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ily ties for example, which would argue strongly in favor of proba­
tion rather than imprisonment.52 
This relationship between pre-trial status and case outcome de­
mands that the system be reformed absent some compelling state in­
terest in maintaining the system as operated in the circuit court. 53 
The need for reform is further supported by the failure of the money 
bail system to serve its purpose, assuring court appearances. A com­
parison of the Allen Circuit Court with the superior court, which has 
operated a bail services program since 1972, confirms that a less re­
strictive means is available which better serves the state's interest in 
several respects. Through the bail services program, acourt-ap­
pointed commissioner interviews persons charged with a crime 
within a few hours after their arrests to determine whether they 
should be released on their own recognizance or conditions other 
than monetary or property bond. The services of this project were 
also available to the circuit court, but the judge chose not to partici­
pate.54 Allen County, therefore, provided an ideal situation for com­
parison of the effectiveness of the two types of release in promoting 
the state's sole interest in the pre-trial release process, ensuring an 
accused's presence in court for all scheduled appearances. 
To make this comparison, a second study was undertaken as 
part of the Mudd case. It is based on 297 cases filed in the superior 
court and 203 cases filed in the circuit court, representing all the fel­
ony cases filed in the superior and circuit courts during 1976. The 
data revealed that eighty-two percent of the defendants in the supe­
rior court were released at some point prior to final disposition com­
pared to only sixty-six percent of the defendants in the circuit 
52. Under IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-lA-1O (Burns 1979), the pre-sentence investi­
gation includes gathering information relating to employment history and family situa­
tion. Id. Clearly, a person who is employed and able to support any dependents at the 
time of sentencing can make a more persuasive argument for probation. Why should the 
court disrupt a stable situation by imprisonment? STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 
The Defense Function, commentary to Standards 4-3.6 and 10-1.1 (1980). While infor­
mation on employment and family was not available through the sources used in Mudd 
study (Appendix A) and therefore not included with the other variables examined, dis­
ruption of employment and family ties is a necessary consequence of pretrial detention. 
This helps explain why detention adversely affects sentencing. 
53. It is indeed difficult to imagine any compelling state interest, particularly in 
light of the fact that there seems to be an attractive alternative to money bail. See infra 
notes 55-60 and accompanying text. 
54. See generally, Pre-trial Order, Mudd (filed April 4, 1977). 
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court.55 This difference is very significant in light of the high costs of 
detention, both to the detainees and their families and local taxpay­
ers. There is also an important difference in the way defendants in 
the two courts were released. The superior court released forty­
seven percent of the persons through its bail services program. In 
contrast, the circuit court relied primarily on surety bondsmen; sev­
enty-nine percent of those released purchased a bail bond.56 
The study also showed that the bail services program not only 
resulted in a greater percentage of arrestees being released, it was far 
more successful in achieving the state's sole interest, appearance in 
court. In the superior court, defendants who were released under the 
bail services project were more than three times as likely to appear at 
all court hearings as were those released through bondsmen.57 
Moreover, the ten defendants released by the bail project who 
missed at least one court appearance missed a total of only fourteen 
court appearances, whereas the thirty-four defendants released 
through bondsmen missed a total of sixty-one court appearances. 58 
55. Pretrial Status by Court 
Circuit Superior 
Released 66 82 
Never Released 26 12 
N.A.· 8 6 
100% 100% 
(203) (297) 
." N.A." means nonascertainable. These 14 cases are excluded from subsequent 
analysis. 
56. Type 0/Release by Court 
Circuit Superior 
Bail Service 47 
Bondsmen 79· 45 
Cash or Property Posted II 2 
Court Releases (ROR) 3 6 




• Ninety-two percent (92%) of the 106 circuit court defendants released by bondsmen 
were released by only two bondsmen. 
57. Appearance Rate by Type 0/Release in Superior Court 
Bail Project Bondsmen 
Appeared 91 69 
Not Appeared 9 31 
100% 100% 
(114) (Ill) 
58. Affidavit of Biesiada at 5-10, Brief of Appellants, A-78 to -80 app., Mudd. 
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Opponents of bail reform might respond to such statistics by 
stating \hat bpndsmen get only the poor risks in the superior court 
because the bail project gets the first opportunity to select the better 
risks. But during the period studied, the bail services program in 
Allen County released seventy-eight percent of all interviewed per­
sons charged with a felony. 59 More significantly, similar nonappear­
ance rates were found in the circuit court where, because the judge 
did not participate in the bail project, bondsmen had the opportunity 
to release both the good and bad risks. In fact, the nonappearance 
rates of surety releases between the circuit and superior courts were 
almost identical: thirty percent in circuit court and thirty-one per­
cent in superior court.60 Moreover, the thirty-two defendants in the 
circuit court who missed at least one court appearance missed a total 
of sixty-three court hearings-a figure again strikingly similar to that 
(sixty-one) obtained in the superior court. 
The significantly higher nonappearance rate in cases which de­
fendants were released through surety bondsmen is not surprising. 
Because bondsmen keep the ten percent bond premium, whether or 
not court appearances are made, defendants have no financial incen­
tive to appear in court. Therefore, the money bail system not only 
deprives persons of basic constitutional rights and imposes a dispro­
portionate impact upon indigents, it is not as effective as lesser re­
strictive alternatives in promoting the only legitimate state interest 
- assuring court appearances. 
What was found in Allen County, Indiana, is certainly not 
unique to that community; it is probably typical of the bail system in 
Indiana and the nation as a whole. Testimony at an early hearing in 
the Mudd case suggested that there were only a few bail projects 
operating in Indiana.61 On the national level, one report identified 
115 bail projects operating in the country as of mid-1975.62 With 
some variations, the general approach of such projects is to make an 
59. Affidavit of James R. Seely at 1 1 (dated May 9, 1977); Plaintiffs Motion for 
Summary Judgment app., Mudd(filed May 16, 1977). Mr. Seely is the bail commissioner 
of the Allen Superior Court. 
60. Appearance Rate ofSurety Releases by Court 
Circuit Superior 
Appeared 70 69 
Not Appeared 30 31 
100% 100% 
(106) (Ill) 
61. Mudd, 68 F.R.D. at 528. 
62. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL EVALUATION PROGRAM PHASE I SUMMARY 
REpORT: PRETRIAL RELEASE PROGRAMS 7 (1977). The projects identified were de­
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individual determination, promptly after arrest, of the most relevant 
factors tending to indicate whether or not the accused will make 
scheduled court appearances. These factors typically include length 
of residence in the community, employment status, family ties, prior 
criminal record, character references, nature of the offense charged 
and, if not the first offense, prior appearance record. The success of 
these projects is generally accepted and they result in the release of 
many accused persons prior to trial without posting any type of mon­
etary or property bond.63 This method both saves the taxpayers the 
expense of unnecessary detention and protects the state's interest. 
Despite the well-documented success of these bail reform 
projects and the continuous criticism of money bail,64 many states 
like Indiana continue to rely almost exclusively on the money bail 
system. This is true even though, at an average cost of $20.00 per 
day, it costs taxpayers nearly $20,000.00 per day to "house" the per­
sons being held in Indiana jails awaiting tria1.65 The most disturbing 
element i.il most cases is that there has never been an individualized 
judicial inquiry into the need for monetary bail. In most Indiana 
scribed as "pretrial release programs that provided an alternative to the traditional 
money bail system." 
63. 'See generally, W. THOMAS, BAIL REFORM IN AMERICA (1976); Goldkamp, 
Philadelphia Revisited' An Examination ofBail and IJetention Two IJecades After Foote 
26 CRIME AND DELINQUENCY 179 (April 1980); Report of the Director of the Adminis­
trative Office of the United States Courts on the Operation of Title 11 of the Speedy Trial 
Act of 1974 (Sept. 30, 1978). 
64. Courts and commentators alike have written of its evils and inequities. Com­
menting on the roles of the commercial bondsmen and the court, Judge J. Skelly Wright 
has observed: 
They [commercial bondsmen) determine for whom they will act as 
surety-who in their judgment is a good risk. The bad risks, in the bondsmen's 
judgment, and the ones who are unable to pay the bondsmen's fee, remain in 
jail. The court and commissioner are relegated the relatively unimportant 
choice of fixing the amount of bail. 
Pannel v. United States, 320 F.2d 698, 699 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Comment, Constitutional 
Law: Equal Protection/or Indigents in the Bail System, 17 WASHBURN L.J. 648 (1978); 
Note, Bail in the United States: A System in Need of Reform, 20 HASTINGS L.J. 380 
(1968); The Bail System: Is It Acceptable?, 29 OHIO ST.L.J. 1005 (1968); Rankin, The 
Effect ofPretrial IJetention, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 641 (1964). 
65. In Indiana, as of February 1978, there were approximately 2,453 persons being 
held in local jails. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, LEAA, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
STATISTICS 1980, Table 6.8, at 482. At that time, on the national level there were 158,394 
persons held in local jails, id., and roughly 40% of them were awaiting trial. Id., Table 
6.10, at 483. Assuming the same percentage in Indiana, the daily population of persons 
awaiting trial in Indiana jails is at least 980. The cost per day per inmate averages 
around $20.00. This figure is based on the average charge to the federal government for 
housing federal pre-trial detainees in local Indiana jails. Telephone conversation with 
the office of the U.S. Marshall for the Northern District of Indiana(Aug. 1981). 
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counties, bail is set pursuant to a schedule which takes into account 
only the crime charged, not the individual accused.66 
If there are so many defects in the m()ney bail system, both in 
terms of costs to taxpayers and the accused and in promoting the 
state's interest in assuring appearance in court, the obvious question 
is why has it been allowed to survive? There are several possible 
explanations, but two seem most compelling: the insurance indus­
try's self-interest in maintaining the status quo and law enforce­
ment's inclination to use pre-trial detention as a preventive 
measure.67 
The powerful insurance industry obviously has a vested interest 
in maintaining the money bail system. Because the premium paid 
for a bail bond is never returned, even after all of the appearances 
are made as scheduled, bail bonding is very profitable. In Allen 
County, Indiana, for example, during the three-year period of 1974­
76, bondsmen wrote bonds totalling $1,243,000 for the 440 circuit 
court defendants they released, of which they received ten percent or 
$124,300.68 As noted, in 1976 alone, thirty-two of their 106 clients 
missed a total of sixty-three court appearances. Yet during the pe­
riod 1974-76, only seven judgments were entered against bondsmen 
in the total amount of $11,000. Bondsmen thus received a gross in­
66. For example, the study of the Allen Circuit Court revealed that bond was set 
pursuant to the master schedule in 77% of the cases. See infra Appendix A at 308. 
Under Indiana law each court must adopt a bond schedule. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-33-8­
4(a)(Burns Supp. 1983). 
67. The merits and legality of preventive detention are currently the subject of 
much debate. An attorney general task force recently came out in favor of preventive 
detention. N.Y. Times, Aug. 17, 1981, at AI, col. 5. See also Kennedy, A New Approach 
to Bail Release: The Proposed Federal Criminal Code and Bail Reform, 48 FORDHAM L. 
REv. 423 (1980); Duke, Bail Reform/or the Eighties: A Reply to Senator Kennedy, 49 
FORDHAM L. REv. 40 (1980); Castle, Trends Restricting the Right to Bail' The Constitu­
tionality 0/Pretrial Detention in Non-Capital Offenses, 3 CRIM. JUST. J. 433 (1980); Flem­
ming, Kohfeld & Uhlman, The Limits ofBail Reform: A Quasi-Experimental Analysis, 14 
L. & SOC'Y REv. 947 (1980); Stevens, Preventive Detention and Equal Protection 0/ the 
Law in Texas, 10 ST. MARY'S L.J. 133 (1978). A recent decision, Hunt v. Roth, 648 F.2d 
1148 (8th Cir. 1981), vacated sub nom., Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478 (1982), raises ques­
tions about the constitutionality of preventive detention. The court declared unconstitu­
tional under the eighth amendment a provision of the Nebraska constitution which 
denies bail to persons charged with certain sexual offenses. 648 F.2d at 1165. The 
Supreme Court vacated and remanded with instructions to dismiss based on mootness. 
455 U.S. at 484. A New York statute, authorizing pretrial detention of juveniles where 
there is a serious risk that the accused would commit certain crimes before his return 
date, was found unconstitutional in Martin v. Strasburg, 689 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1982), 
prob. juris. noted sub nom., Schall v. Martin, 103 S. Ct. 1765 (1983). 
68. Two bondsmen wrote $1,072,000 (85%) of this amount. This information was 
obtained as part of the second study in the Mudd case. See supra text accompanying 
notes 55-60. 
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come of $113,300·($124,300 minus $11,000) in a three-year period 
alone.69 . 
For this profit, bondsmen are expected to apprehend the de­
fendants and return them to court. Although data regarding their 
success in this endeavor was not available, it is noteworthy that in 
1976 the circuit court issued twenty-three bench warrants for the 
sixty-three times surety-released defendants failed to appear. Thus, 
in over one-third of their cases, bondsmen are assisted by law en­
forcement officials in apprehending fugitives-a job which bonds­
men are paid to do themselves. 
This point is further demonstrated by some statistics from 
California: 
Last year [1979] bail bondsmen in California collectively 
wrote bonds having a face value of approximately $350 million. 
Ninety percent of these bonds were underwritten by just four in­
surance or surety companies at little risk and enormous profit. In 
order to protect their profits, these companies and their bondsman 
agents, operating through professional lobbyists, annually mount 
an effective campaign to defeat any bill that would modify, no 
matter how modestly, the status quo.70 
Like California, in Indiana there are only a small number of insur­
ance companies licensed to write surety bonds.71 There is relatively 
little risk in the business because the experience in Indiana suggests 
that forfeiture of the bond is rarely ordered.72 
The intensity of the lobbying efforts by the industry is illustrated 
by the recent conviction of an Indiana state senator for accepting 
bribes from a lobbyist for the industry.73 Indiana is not the only 
state in which there is evidence of illegal lobbying on behalf of 
bondsmen. In the past several years, sixty-two court officials in three 
states, including a Michigan Supreme Court justice, were convicted 
69. This assumes the judgments were collected but the information available did 
not indicate whether they had in fact been collected. Id. 
70. Kline, The Politics of Bail Reform and tlte Needfor Judicial Intervention, U 
WEST L.A. L. REV. I, 6 (1980). 
71. A list supplied by the Indiana Department of Insurance in 1981 indicates there 
are only six companies licensed to write surety bonds. 
72. For the Allen County experience during 1974-76, see mpra text accompanying 
notes 68-69. A telephone conversation with an Indiana Department of Insurance official 
indicates there is no current statistical data available concerning this. 
73. Indianapolis Star, Dec. 19, 1980, at I, col. 6. State Senator Martin K. Edwards 
was convicted on several counts of bribery in attempts to influence bail bond legislation. 
Id. 
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of taking or extorting bribes from bail bondsmen.74 The Federal 
Trade Commission has investigated the bail bond industry for rate­
fixing and rate-enforcing boycotts.75 An example of an effective boy­
cott is found in Tennessee where bondsmen protested a reform effort 
by refusing to write bonds. The reform effort was withdrawn, when, 
as a result of the boycott, the jail population tripled.76 
The efforts of bondsmen are not limited to lobbying. The pro­
ject operated by the superior court was subjected to a court challenge 
by a bondsman in Allen County.77 In Kentucky several suits were 
filed by bondsmen after legislation outlawed commercial bail bond­
ing entirely.78 The point is simply that the powerful insurance in­
dustry is not allowing bail reform without a battle. 
A second factor contributing to the maintenance of the bail sys­
tem is that the prevailing mood in the country is not sympathetic 
toward persons accused of crime. The presumption of innocence be­
comes important to most people only when they have first-hand ex­
perience with the criminal justice system. The current trend seems in 
favor of legitimizing the use of bail to keep potentially dangerous 
persons in jail prior to trial - a practice known as "preventive de­
tention."79 Judges are obviously not immune from or out of touch 
with this mood. The failure of the Allen Circuit Court to participate 
in the bail services project is an excellent example of how firmly the 
monetary bail system is entrenched. 
The need for reform is obvious but it has not progressed rapidly 
despite efforts by well-respected organizations such as the American 
Bar Association.80 Probably the most comprehensive reform is the 
Federal Bail Reform Act of 1966,81 which requires that any person 
charged with an offense, other than one punishable by death, 
shall, at his appearance before a judicial officer, be ordered re­
leased pending trial on his personal recognizance or upon the exe­
74. DeRhoda, Whither 'he Bail Bondsmen?, NAT'L L.J. Jan. 22, 1979. 
75. Id. See also, e.g.,In re Texas Ass'n of Professional Surs. & Ass'n of Profes­
sional Surs. of Houston, 95 F.T.C. 300 (1980). 
76. DeRhoda, supra note 74, at 1. 
77. Lee v. Bail Comm'rs, No. C-76-153 (Adams Cir. Ct., dismissed Nov. 30, 1976). 
The plaintiff in this case is one of the bondsmen referred to supra note 68. 
78. See Ky. REv. STAT. § 304.34-010(1)(1981). See also Benboe v. Carroll, 625 
F.2d 737 (6th Cir. 1980); Johnson Bonding Co. v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 420 
F.Supp. 331 (E.D. Ky. 1976); Stephens v. Bonding Ass'n, 538 S.W.2d 580 (Ky. 1976). 
79. See supra note 67. 
80. See generally ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO PRETRIAL RELEASE (Approved 
Draft 1968). 
81. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3146-52 (1982). 
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cution of an unsecured appearance bond in an amount specified 
by the judicial officer, subject to the condition that such person not 
commit an offense under [certain statutes], unless the officer deter­
mines, in the exercise of his discretion, that such a release will not 
reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required.82 
To some extent, this presumption of release absent a showing of a 
need for conditions has been achieved in California through a recent 
state supreme court decision.83 The federal act goes further and re­
quires, when the judicial officer determines something other than 
personal recognizance is necessary, that the least restrictive means of 
assuring appearance be used. It requires that the officer "impose the 
first [of a list of] conditions of release which will reasonably assure 
the appearance of the person for trial."84 The judicial officer is fur­
ther required, in determining which conditions to impose, to take 
into account certain specified individual circumstances.85 
In addition to the federal reform, a few states have enacted re­
form legislation. The Kentucky law imposing an absolute ban on 
commercial bail bonding has been previously discussed.86 Oregon, 
while not banning bail bonding entirely, has established a range of 
alternatives which have had the effect of eliminating many bail 
82. 18 U.S.C. § 3 I 46(a) (1982) (emphasis added). 
83. Van Atta v. Scott, 27 Cal. 3d 424,613 P.2d 210, 166 Cal. Rptr. 149 (1980). 
84. 18 U.S.c. § 3 1 46(a) (1982). The possible conditions are: 
(1) place the person in the custody of a designated person or organization 
agreeing to supervise him; 
(2) place restrictions on the travel, association, or place of abode of the 
person during the period of release; 
(3) require the execution of an appearance bond in a specified amount and 
the deposit in the registry of the court, in cash or other security as directed, of a 
sum not to exceed 10 per centum of the amount of the bond, such deposit to be 
returned upon the performance of the conditions of release; 
(4) require the execution of a bail bond with sufficient solvent sureties, or 
the deposit of cash in lieu thereof; or 
(5) impose any other condition deemed reasonably necessary to assure ap­
pearance as required, including a condition requiring that the person return to 
custody after specified hours. 
Id. 
85. 18 U.S.C. § 3 I 46(b) (1982). 

[T1he nature and circumstances of the offense charged, the weight of the evi­

dence against the accused, the accused's family ties, employment, financial re­

sources, character and mental condition, the length of his residence in the 
community, his record of convictions, and his record of appearance at court 
proceedings or of flight to avoid prosecution or failure to appear at court 
proceedings. 
Id. These are similar to factors considered by projects which release on the inmate's own 
recognizance (ROR). 
86. . See supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
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bondsmen. The Oregon law provides that the judge shall impose the 
least onerous condition necessary to assure a defendant's appearance 
at trial.87 
Illinois was one of the first states to enact bail reform legislation 
with what has become known as the "ten percent deposit plan."88 
Under this system a defendant posts ten percent of the amount of the 
bond directly with the court clerk and, upon meeting all scheduled 
court appearances, most of the deposit is retumed.89 The obvious 
advantage of this system is that, unlike a system utilizing bonding 
companies, it gives the accused a financial incentive to make the 
scheduled court appearances.90 
The "ten percent deposit plan" was approved by the Indiana 
Court of Appeals in a case upholding the inherent power of trial 
courts to give the accused an option of either using a surety bond, a 
property bond, a full cash bond or posting ten percent of the total 
bond with the court clerk.91 This result was codified in 1980 with the 
87. OR. REV. STAT. § 135.230-290 (1981). In Burton v. Tomlinson, 19 Or. App. 
247,255, 527 P.2d 123, 128 (1974), the court rejected a challenge by bondsmen to the 
Oregon statute, stating: 
Because the legislature saw fit to greatly enlarge the opportunities of a defend­
ant for release prior to judgment, with resulting drastic diminution in the de­
mand for plaintiffs' services, it did not thereby deprive them of property but, at 
most, only of the benefit to them ftowing from the previously existing status 
quo. 
Id. 
88. ILL. AMi. STAT. ch. 38, § 110-7 (Smith-Hurd 1980). 
89. Under the Illinois plan, 90% of the deposit was returned and the remaining 
10% was retained by the court as the administration fee. This reform measure was up­
held in Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 359 (1971), in which the Court stated: 
Prior to 1964 the professional bail bondsmen system with all its abuses was 
in full and odorous bloom in Illinois. Under that system the bail bondsman 
customarily collected the maximum fee (10% of the amount of the bond) permit­
ted by statute . . . and retained that entire amount even though the accused 
fully satisfied the conditions of the bond.(Footnote omitted) 
90. It also has the advantage of making the same funds available to pay for coun­
sel, i.e., the amount posted with the clerk can be assigned to the attorney. This helps 
relieve the public defender system. For example, assume a criminal charge with bond set 
at $5,000; the accused would have to pay $500 to the clerk; of this, $50 would be retained 
as the administrative fee and $450 would be returned to the accused. However, the ac­
cused might have assigned this to a private attorney in order to obtain representation. 
The net result is that more criminal defendants are able to afford to pay for their own 
counsel, thus reducing the load of public defenders. See generally Minutes of the Indiana 
Legislature'S Interim Study Committee on Bail Bonding, July 17, 1979 (testimony of Jim 
Drogge), September 18, 1979 (testimony of Judge Richard Muroc). 
91. Board of County Comm'rs v. Farris, 168 Ind. App. 309, 342 N.E.2d 642 
(CLApp. 1976). Retention oflO% of the deposit by the clerk as an administrative fee was 
also upheld by the appellate court. 
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passage of a new bail act in Indiana.92 While this act clarified the 
courts' options in terms of the ten percent deposit system and the use 
of non-monetary conditions93 and codified the factors to be taken 
into account in setting bail or conditions,94 importantly it did not 
mandate the use of the least restrictive alternative. Nor did it ad­
dress the issue of who had the burden of establishing the need for 
conditions other than release on the recognizance of the accused.95 
The primary advantage of the 1980 legislation in Indiana is that 
it clearly gives courts the ability to implement bail reform measures 
without questions of their legality. It is hoped that more court sys­
tems will realize the state's only interest can be better served through 
methods other than the monetary bail system at a substantial savings 
to the community by reducing the number of pre-trial detainees 
whose incarceration is so costly.96 
As demonstrated above, the evidence in favor of reform, both in 
terms of equity and in achieving the state's purpose is overwhelming. 
Professor Foote has indicated that, as applied to indigent defendants, 
the money bail requirement represents the "incredible failure of the 
Supreme Court, courts in general and lawyers to do anything about 
what has become the most pervasive denial of equal justice in the 
entire criminal justice system ...."'97 Even absent reform, how­
ever, the existing system would be more responsive to indigents if 
they had effective counsel, who immediately upon arrest could peti­
tion the court on their behalf, for bond reduction and/or release 
without monetary conditions. Clearly, the evils of the monetary bail 
system are exacerbated in situations where the accused is either with­
out counselor provided with counsel who routinely ignore the op­
portunity to seek a reduction of bail. 
92. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-33-8-3(2) (West Supp. 1983-84). 
93. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-33-8-3 (West Supp. 1983-84). 
94. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-33-8-4 (West Supp. 1983-84). 
95. It should be noted that this act was never intended as a "reform" measure in 
the sense that it would make release more attainable for more people. Rather, it was 
proposed by the Marion County prosecuting attorney as a revision "that would protect 
the public and not encourage crime." Minutes of the Indiana Legislature's Interim Study 
Committee on Bail Bonding, Aug. 16, 1979. More specifically, he advocated the provi­
sions of IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-33-8-5 through 6 (West Supp. 1983-84)conceming revo­
cation and detention for up to 15 days if charged with an offense while on parole or 
probation. Id. 
96. See supra note 65 regarding the cost of housing pretrial detainees. 
97. Foote, Pretrial Detention: Bailor Jail?, Crime and Justice in America, ParI II , 
The Gainesville Sun, Nov. 21, 1977, at 8, col. e, quoted in Pugh v. Rainwater, 572 F.2d 
1053, 1068 (5th Cir. 1978). 
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IV. THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL-THE PROBLEMS OF BOTH 

INDIGENT DEFENDANTS AND ATTORNEYS WHEN 

COUNSEL IS ApPOINTED BY THE COURT 

The competent assistance of counsel, court-appointed if neces­
sary, is now a clearly established constitutional right in any criminal 
case where a sentence of imprisonment can be imposed.98 Precisely 
what is required of competent representation, however, is less clear. 
Although the trend is toward a more demanding minimum standard 
of professional representation,99 it is still difficult to obtain reversal 
of a conviction based on incompetence of counsel. This reluctance 
to overturn otherwise valid convictions can be explained, at least in 
part, by the need to show that counsel's shortcoming affected the 
outcome. iOO Reversal of a conviction might also be viewed as too 
drastic a remedy. In view of the absence of an effective remedy at 
the appellate level, it is even more critical that trial courts assure 
effective assistance of counsel in the first instance. 
Inadequacy of representation is more likely to be raised when 
the accused has been represented by appointed counsel,lOi than 
when the accused has retained counsel of his choice. \02 This is true 
98. Since its landmark decision in 1932 in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), 
requiring counsel in capital cases, the Supreme Court has recognized that the sixth 
amendment right to counsel is incorporated through the due process clause of the four­
teenth amendment and therefore applicable to the states. This case also established that 
the assistance of counsel must be "effective and substantial." Id. at 53. Subsequently in 
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 341-45 (1963), the Court extc:!nded Powell and held 
that the states must provide attorneys for indigent defendants in all felony cases. Finally, 
in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 40 (1972), the Court held that defendants could 
not be imprisoned in misdemeanor cases unless represented by counsel. See also Scott v. 
lllinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979). 
99. An earlier standard, known as the "mockery of justice" test, was based on the 
due process clause. The representation would be found ineffective only when the defense 
counsel's efforts had been so perfunctory or outrageous as to render the entire trial such a 
farce, mockery, travesty or sham that it shocked the conscience of the reviewing court. 
See, e.g., United States v. Dilella, 354 F.2d 584 (7th Cir. 1965). More recently several 
courts have abandoned the "mockery ofjustice" test and have held that the sixth amend­
ment "guarantees a criminal defendant legal assistance which meets a minimum stan­
dard of professional representation." See, e.g., United States ex reI. Williams v. 
Twomey, 510 F.2d 634, 640-41 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 876 (1975). See generally 
Note, Effective Assistance of Counsel' A Constitutional Right in Transition, 10 VAL. 
U.L.REV. 509 (1976). 
100. See, e.g., United States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d 196 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (en bane); 
Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1978) (en bane), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 974 
(1979). 
101. Burt, Conflict and Trust Between Attorney and Client, 69 GEO. L.J. 1015,1039 
(1981). 
102. While an indigent is clearly entitled to court-appointed counsel, this does not 
include the right to select a particular attorney. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 604 
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for a number of reasons, including delays in appointment of counsel 
for indigents, overly burdensome caseloads of public defenders, and 
the inability of an incarcerated client to go to the attorney's office 
and actively participate in his defense. Direct employment of the 
appointed attorney by the court can lead to less than complete alle­
giance to the indigent client. These problems exist where the attor­
neys are full-time defenders, but they are magnified when the 
defenders are part-time because of the inevitable tension between 
public defender responsibilities and the demands of a private 
practice. 
Another explanation for more claims of inadequacy when rep­
resented by appointed counsel might be clients' unfavorable percep­
tion of their attorney. A recent study comparing the predispositions 
of clients toward private defense counsel and public defenders lO3 re­
vealed that defendants have "strikingly different images" of private 
counsel and defenders. 104 Whether the clients' perceptions are cor­
rect is unimportant because the existence of the perception will nor­
mally lead to an unsatisfatory attorney-client relationship; 
dissatisfaction with the relationship often leads to claims of incom­
petency, whether or not the service provided was adequate. lOS Pub-
F.2d 474,478 (7th Cir. 1979); Harling v. United States, 387 A.2d 1101, 1105 (D.C. 1978); 
State v. Irvin, 259 Ind. 610, 615, 291 N.E.2d 70,74 (1973). Nor does it include the right to 
a "meaningful relationship" between the accused and the attorney. Morris v. Siappy, 103 
S. Ct. 1610, 1617 (1983)(quoting Siappy v. Morris, 649 F.2d 718, 720 (9th Cir. 1981». 
103. Casper,lmproving Defender-Client Relations, 34 NLADA BRIEFCASE 114, No. 
4 (Aug. 1977). See also, Burt, Conflict and Trust Between Allomey and Client, 69 GEO. 
L.l. lOIS, 1020-21, 1035-45 (1981). It is important to keep in mind the fact that many, if 
not most, public defender clients are detained prior to trial. Some courts have a practice 
of refusing to appoint counsel to any defendant who can make bail, but the Indiana 
Supreme Court has recently ruled that "the fact that the defendant was able to post a 
bond is not determinative of his non-indigency but is only a factor to be considered." 
Moore v. State, 401 N.E.2d 676, 679 (Ind. 1980). 
104. First, there are relatively lar&e and consistent differences in perceptions 
of retained counsel and defenders, With larger numbers of defendants endorsing 
favorable views of private lawyers. What is important is not whether defendant 
perce.ptions are correct - and there is a good deal of evidence that their views 
of pnvate lawyers miss the hasty and often exploitive character of many crimi­
nal practices - but that substantial numbers of defendants bring to their en­
counters with defenders, doubts about their potential lawyers' 
commitment. . . . 
To put the matter crudely, it appears that most defendants do not believe that 
public defenders want to sell ilierr clients out - indeed large numbers have the 
opposite belief - but that many are skeptical about the extent to which defend­
ers really are inclined to fight hard to achieve their clients' goals. Although they 
may be incorrect, relativeTy few entertain such doubts about private lawyers. 
Casper, supra note 103, at 116. 
105. In other words, "public relations" is an important part of practicing law and 
the appointed counsel who is "forced" upon a client goes into the relationship having to 
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lic defenders who are in fact doing a competent job for their clients 
end up with disgruntled clients simply because of the general jail­
house perception of defenders. 
This raises several questions: first, whether it is merely a prob­
lem of perception or do defender-clients really suffer from poor 
quality representation; and second, whether the problem is merely 
perceived or real, can anything be done to alleviate it? These ques­
tions are important because of the vital role played by counsel in the 
criminal justice system. The advantage of having an advocate famil­
iar with the legal system is tremendous, particularly when an ac­
cused is incarcerated prior to trial without any meaningful access to 
the procedural safeguards that can be readily invoked by an 
attorney. 106 
There is evidence in at least one Indiana county that the jail­
house perception of the defender system is accurate. The method of 
providing appointed counsel in this county is by no means unique. 
In Indiana the means of providing court-appointed counsel is left 
almost entirely to the discretion of the trial courts. \07 The trial 
courts determine indigency\08 and most appoint attorneys who are 
part-time employees of the court as "pauper counsel." Under such 
an arrangement one or more attorneys, depending on the number of 
criminal cases in the county, are employed on a part-time basis on 
overcome an adverse mind-set. This is consistent with general American philosophy that 
you "get what you pay for." 
The extent to which defendants choose the financial transaction as the reason 
for the better performance of private attorneys suggest that what most attracts 
defendants to private attorneys is the notion that, because of the financial ex­
change between lawyer and client, the lawyer will be more committed to the 
defendant's interests. It is the money that provides a sense of control, the lever­
age to insure that lawyers will listen to their client, take instructions from them, 
and generally exert themselves on their behalf. Public defenders, however, are 
not only paid by someone other than the client, but that "someone other" is 
"the state" - the very institution that is proceeding against the defendant. 
Thus, public defenders suffer not only from the fact that they are imposed upon 
the defendant rather than being selected, and from the absence of financial ex­
change, but from the idea that they are employed by "the enemy." 
Casper, supra note 103, at 126. To the extent that money is the key, Casper suggests that 
public defender clients are simply being "good Americans." Id. 
106. These safeguards include a prompt appearance before a judicial officer, a re­
lease unless there is probable cause for a criminal charge, an individualized bail determi­
nation, the right to refuse making statements, discovery and a pretrial investigation. 
107. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 33-9-10-1 (West 1983). It provides that "[t)he 
judges of any court having criminal jurisdiction,. . . shall have the power to contract. . . 
to provide legal counsel for ... poor persons ...." Id. 
108. Moore v. State, 401 N.E.2d 676,678 (Ind. 1980). 
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the court budget and are expected to handle all "pauper" cases. 109 
Generally, these attorneys also maintain a private practice in the 
community. 
The "system" described above existed in Lake County, Indiana 
in 1974 when the adequacy of court-appointed counsel was chal­
lenged in Hoe v. County ofLake. 110 In this case, the plaintiffs raised 
several issues, including the general lack of resources made available 
for the representation of indigents and the inherent conflict, or lack 
of independence, resulting from the fact that the court-appointed at­
torneys were employees of the court. II I The complaint did not at­
tack the competence of any particular attorney, but rather 
challenged the system within which they operated. 
As part of the presentation to the federal court in Hoe, a study 
of the system was prepared. 112 This study, based on a sample of 
1,730 casesll3 from the Criminal Division of Indiana's Lake County 
Superior Court, sought to measure objectively, and make compari­
sons between, the performance of retained and appointed counsel. 
Because all of the defenders were employed by the court on a part­
time basis and several maintained a private criminal practice, the 
Lake County system provided a unique opportunity to compare the 
109. Criminal Courts Technical Assistance Project, The Structure and Funding for 
Criminal Defense of Indigents in Indiana 16-25 (1974) (unpublished report); Kittel, lJe­
fense ofthe Poor: A Study in Public Parsimony andPrivate Poverty, 45 IND. L.J. 90, 91-95 
(1969). While court-appointed attorneys were generally referred to as "pauper counsel" 
in the Lake County system, we will hereinafter refer to them as "public defenders". 
110. 468 F. Supp. 50 (N.D. Ind. 1978), affd, 601 F.2d 595 (7th Cir. 1979). 
111. According to the evidence in Noe, the chief judge of the criminal division of 
the Lake County Superior Court personally hired the public defenders as well as their 
support staff. In addition, he occasionally attended staff meetings of the defenders and 
could discharge any defender or staff member at will. All the public defenders were 
employed on a part-time basis, and most were also engaged in private law practices 
which often included the representation of criminal defendants in the same court. 
In 1972, the year before the case was filed, only two part-time defenders had the 
responsibility for representing all indigents charged with felonies in Lake County. Two 
additional part-time defenders were added in 1973, and the budget has steadily increased 
so that by 1977, $242,130 was allocated solely for the salaries of 13 part-time defenders, 
two investigators, and two secretaries. 
The determination of an accused's eligibility for representation by a public defender 
was not made until the first court appearance and normally several days elapsed between 
the date of arrest and this initial appearance by the defendant. Assuming the accused 
was found eligible, the judge then appointed the defender staff as an entirety, and a 
specific attorney would not begin representation until designated by the chief defender. 
Thus, indigents would not know who would ultimately be representing them until after 
arraignment. See generally Pretrial Order, Noe (filed Feb. 2, 1977). 
112. See infra Appendix B. 
113. These cases were filed in 1975-76 and disposed of by July 31, 1977. See infra 
Appendix B at 323. 
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performance of an attorney acting in a private capacity with that of 
the same attorney serving as appointed counsel. l14 This comparison 
would suggest that any difference between appointed and private 
counsel could be ascribed not to general incompetence or lack of 
ability on the part of appointed counsel, but to the "system." Impor­
tant conclusions can be drawn from this study which reflect the 
problems of indigents represented by court-appointed counsel in a 
system such as that which existed in Lake County. 
The study showed there was a significant delay between the date 
of arrest and the appointment of a public defender. The average 
length of delay was twelve days and, in one-fourth of the cases, the 
defender was not appointed until at least fourteen days after ar­
resLllS This reflects only the delay in appointment and not the addi­
tional delay between appointment and actual contact between 
attorney and client. The accused indigent is thus going through a 
critical point in the process without the benefit of counsel. I 16 
The study compares the results in cases in which the defendants 
114. Of the 19 attorneys who were employed as part-time defenders during the 
period studied, 14 also handled criminal cases in the same court in a private capacity. 
Twenty percent or 188 of the 920 cases handled by private attorneys were handled by 
defenders acting in their private capacity. See infra Appendix B at 323-24. 
115. See id. The Mudd study showed a similar delay in appointment of counsel in 
the Allen County Circuit Court. See Brief of Appellants A-86 app. filed in Mudd. 
116. The early stages are critical for several reasons. Waivers of fundamental con­
stitutional rights, e.g., self-incrimination and consent to searches and seizures, occur most 
frequently during the pre-arraignment stage. Factual development is most effective at 
the earliest possible date. A good example is the need to obtain experts before perishable 
or transitory evidence is lost. In addition, particularly in situations where the prosecutor 
makes the determination of whether and what to charge, defense counsel can do the most 
effective plea bargaining very early and may even affect the charge that is filed. Finally, 
if counsel enters the case at the "focus of suspicion stage," he or she will be better pre­
pared at the initial court appearances. 
For these reasons, the standards of the National Legal Aid and Defender 
Association (11-2), the National Study Commission on Defense Services (1.2), 
all call for representation at the point at which the person comes under, or 
appears to come under, the focus of suspicion of crime. Representation that 
first attaches at the initial hearing may be too late to protect vital constitutional 
rights that the defendant has waived. A defense counsel who enters the case at 
a still later point may find that his ability to render effective assistance to his 
client may have been totally negated by the very time at which appointment 
was made. 
Affidavit of Laurence A. Benner (September 29, 1977); Mr. Benner, through his affidavit, 
testified as an expert witness in the Hoe case. At that time he was National Director of 
Defense Services for the National Legal Aid and Defender Association and had exten­
sive experience in criminal justice, both as defense counsel and through studies of de­
fense services. See also COURTS, Standard 13.1 commentary 254 (National Advisory 
Comm. on Crim.Justice Standards and Goals 1973). 
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were represented by public defenders with those in private counsel 
cases and, where the information was available, results when defend-. 
ers acted in their private capacity. Three aspects of representation 
were examined: (1) motions to reduce bail,(2) motions for change of 
venue from the judge, and (3) case outcome. 1I7 Not surprisingly, 
criminal defendants with appointed counsel were far more likely to 
be detained prior to trial than those represented by private counsel 
(70% vs. 22%).118 With a significantly higher percentage of clients 
incarcerated prior to trial, one would expect appointed counsel to file 
more motions to reduce bail. Yet, just the opposite was true. Reduc­
tion motions were filed by appointed counsel in only 19% of their 
cases while private counsel filed such motions in 42% of their 
cases. 1I9 Not only did appointed counsel file fewer motions to re­
duce bond, when such motions were filed there was an average lapse 
of thirty-eight days between arrest and filing of the motion in ap­
pointed counsel cases compared to only eighteen days in private 
counsel cases. 120 Private attorneys were successful in 88% of the re­
duction motions while appointed counsel succeeded in 75%.121 
Where such motion was successful, in 97% of the cases handled by 
private counsel the defendant obtained release while 88% of the cli­
ents of appointed counsel actually obtained their release after a suc­
cessful bond reduction motion. 122 
117. See infra Appendix B at 324. These factors were chosen because they are both 
objective and important to the accused. For example, it was generally believed that two 
of the four judges in the criminal division were harsher in sentencing and, therefore, 
private counsel rarely tried their cases before them. A reduction in bail might mean the 
difference between pretrial freedom and continued detention. 
118. See infra Appendix B at 325. 
119. Id 
120. Id. In part, this difference might be explained by the delay in appointment of 
a public defender. 
121. Id. With a success rate of 75%, one might expect that reduction motions 
would be routinely filed in nearly every case. Yet appointed counsel did so in only 19% 
of their cases. 
122. See Brief of Appellants, A-I87 app., filed in Noe. Before simply assuming 
that these figures suggest public defenders are less competent, we must consider some 
other possibilities. First, even though ability to post bond and eligibility for appointed 
counsel cannot be equated, Moore v. State, 401 N.E.2d 676, 679 (Ind. 1980), it can gener­
ally be assumed that the clients of appointed counsel are more indigent and thus less 
likely to benefit from a reduction in bail. Second, those who are "more indigent" are less 
likely to have the community ties which would argue a favor of bond reduction or release 
without monetary bond. Thus, resources play a role, although less direct, even when 
ability to pay is not the sole factor considered. Third, the perception of some judges 
might be that an accused who is paying for counsel is, at least in part, already paying the 
price of being brought into the criminal justice system. None of these, however, would 
explain why fewer reduction motions are filed by appointed counsel. 
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Perhaps even more significant is the defenders' practice with re­
spect to motions for change of venue from the judge. In the cases 
studied, 199 such motions were filed and 63% of them were directed 
at one of the four full-time criminal division judges.123 The study· 
showed that this judge imposed a prison sentence in a significantly 
higher percentage of the cases in which there was a conviction, 124 
and the number of venue motions directed at this judge suggests at­
torneys were well aware of this fact. Since, at the time of the study, 
Indiana law required that a motion for change of venue125 had to be 
granted, it represents an important right of the accused. Signifi­
cantly, appointed attorneys filed only seventeen (8%) of these mo­
tions (in 2% of their 737 cases) whereas private counsel filed 182 
(92%) motions (in 20% of their 909 cases}.126 Not surprisingly, then, 
indigents' cases were far more likely to be heard by this judge than 
the cases of defendants with private counsel. 
This disparity is even more striking when the performance of 
appointed counsel is compared to their conduct when acting as pri­
vate counsel. While they filed venue motions in only 2% of their 
appointed cases, these same attorneys filed venue motions in 26% of 
their private cases. 127 This demonstrates that these attorneys recog­
nize the importance of getting the "right" judge. Also, it suggests that 
despite their own judgment, attorneys, when acting in their capacity 
as defenders employed by the court, were reluctant to follow a prac­
tice which could result in one of the four judges, their employers, 
having few, if any, cases. 128 
Significant disparities in case outcome were also present. Of the 
cases which went to trial, 70% of the clients of appointed counsel 
were convicted whereas only 49% of the clients of private counsel 
123. See infra Appendix B at 326. 
124. Id. 
125. IND. CRIM. R. 12; for a discussion of Rule 12 see Benjamin v. Criminal Court, 
264 Ind. 191,341 N.E.2d 495 (1976); Spugnardi v. State, 171 Ind. App. 272, 356 N.E.2d 
1199 (1976). Rule 12 was amended, effective July I, 1981, and there is no longer a right 
to a change of venue. 
126. See infra Appendix B at 327. 
127. Id. 
128. It should be noted that the initial assignments of cases to particular judges do 
not explain the disparity discussed here. See Appendix to Brief of Appellants, A-188 to ­
189 app., filed in Seventh Circuit in Noe. The potential influence of the employment 
relationship has been noticed by others. Burt, Conflict and Trust Between Attorney and 
Client, 69 GEO. L.J. 1015, 1036-37 (1981); J. CASPER, AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 105 
(1972); A. BLUMBERG, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 66 (1967). 
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were convicted. 129 The overall conviction rate, whether by plea of 
guilty or by conviction following trial, was 67% for clients of ap­
pointed counsel and 58% for clients of private counsel. Because most 
clients with appointed counsel are incarcerated prior to trial, the evi­
dence in Mudd suggests that the disparity is explained in part by 
detention. 130 Nevertheless, even when the clients of appointed coun­
sel were not detained prior to trial, these case outcome statistics re­
main approximately the same.131 
Not only are the clients of appointed counsel convicted more 
often than those represented by private counsel, they are also given 
prison sentences twice as often. Clients of appointed counsel re­
ceived a prison sentence in 49% of the cases while the clients of pri­
vate counsel in only 23% of the cases. In contrast, clients of 
defenders acting in a private capacity received a prison term in only 
22% of the cases. ll2 Examining only the cases in which the accused 
was convicted, 73% of the clients represented by appointed counsel 
received a prison term compared to only 40% of those represented by 
private counsel. While some of this disparity can be explained by 
pre-trial detention, it is significant that among those released-where 
pre-trial detention played no role~efender clients fared worse than 
clients with retained counsel; that is, defender clients were sentenced 
to prison more often. \33 
What can be concluded from these statistics? A fair inference is 
that a public defender system, structured like that in Lake County, 
Indiana, provides less effective representation to indigents than pri­
vate counsel. Notably, the problems stem from the system rather 
than the individual attorneys because the same attorneys who served 
as public defenders achieved results and performed similar to or bet­
ter than other private counsel when they were retained by their 
clients. 
Can anything be done to improve this situation? Regarding de­
fender-client relations or clients' perceptions of defenders, there are 
several possibilities. Because the unfavorable perceptions are not 
contrary to the evidence, fewer convictions and less harsh sentences 
due to attorney efforts would produce higher levels of client satisfac­
129. See infra Appendix B at 328. Fifty-nine percent of the clients of public de­
fenders acting in a private capacity were convicted. Id. 
130. See supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text. 
131. See infra Appendix B at 329. 
132. Id. 
133. Id. 
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tion. 134 In addition, it has been suggested that a non-adversary dis­
position, a plea of guilty, for example, is likely to produce a less 
favorable evaluation because it reduces substantially "the occasions 
upon which a client can observe his attorney fighting on his be­
half."135 This does not mean that plea bargaining should be aban­
doned when it is advantageous. It does indicate that a reputation of 
bargaining all cases can be disastrous. Discussing the reasons for 
strategy decisions can be beneficial, "both so the client can make a 
considered choice and be given a chance to reflect upon the fact that 
waiving a hearing or 'copping a plea' is in his interest and not simply 
the product of laziness- or indifference on the part of his attorney."136 
Defenders can generally improve their relations with clients by in­
volving them in the defense and spending more time with their cli­
ents.137 Clearly there are some things which public defenders can do 
to enhance their reputations among their clients and, consequently, 
improve client satisfaction. 
The "system" can also make a satisfactory appointed counsel! 
client relationship more possible by further distancing the appointed 
attorneys from their employer, the court. The issue of professional 
independence is addressed in the ABA's "Standards Relating to Pro­
viding Defense Services": 
The plan should be designed to guarantee the integrity of the 
relationship between lawyer and client. The plan and the lawyers 
serving it should be free from political influence and should be 
134. Casper, supra note 103, at 130. 
135. Id. 
136. Id. 
Moreover, to the extent that the defendant can participate in or be made 
aware of the degree to which the attorney actually argues on his behalf even in 
the bargaining context - for example, the possibility of permitting the client to 
be present at bargaining sessions, or short of this, simply giving the client a 
clear and detailed account of what occurred - the arguments presented here 
suggest that there may be a possibility for increasing the client's confidence that 
the attorney has done a satisfactory job. 
Id. 
137. [f)he data suggests that such time does have a payoff in terms of client 
satisfaction. The data also suggests that this payoff revolves largely around the 
effective dimension of the client evaluation, not around obtaining more 
favorable outcomes. If we define an adequate legal defense strictly in terms of 
obtaining the most favorable outcome possible for the client, it might be argued 
that time spent with clients is not important. But if we enlarge tlie concept of 
what is an adequate legal defense to encompass providing the client not only 
"justice" .in terms of outcome but also providing him a sense that he has had 
adequate legal representation, then time spent with the client does appear to 
make a difference. 
Id. at 130-31. 
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subject to judicial supervision only in the same manner and to the 
same extent as are the lawyers in private practice. One means for 
assuring this independence, regardless of the type of system 
adopted, is to place the ultimate authority and responsibility for 
the operation of the plan in a board of trustees. 138 
An expert's reflection on the Lake County system is informative. 
The direct employment of part-time public defenders by the 
chief judge of the criminal division ...places those public defend­
ers in a conflict of interest having constitutional magni­
tude. . . .[T)his employment relationship jeopardizes the duty of 
defense counsel to fulfill their role as active and independent ad­
vocates. Indeed, this relationship creates the appearance of im­
propriety while presenting multifarious possibilities for subverting 
the adversary system. The loyalties of defense attorneys should lie 
solely with their clients, and regardless of the integrity of individ­
ual public defenders, the system for employing public defenders in 
the criminal division of the Lake Superior Court violates this pre­
cept. [In such a system] public defenders are placed in the di­
lemma of serving both their clients and the judge, and the result is 
apt to be less than the vigorous advocacy the accused have a right 
to expect. Moreover, clients may understandably view public de­
fenders with suspicion and distrust insofar as they are aware of the 
employment relationship with the chief judge, and this is not con­
ducive to building attitudes of cooperation with counsel and re­
spect for the criminal justice system. 139 
These observations are certainly consistent with findings of the 
study, particularly the reluctance of the defenders to change venue. 
The relationship between the independence of the defenders 
and the outcome of cases was demonstrated by a study comparing 
two cities which utilize independent defender offices with a third city 
where the court assigned private attorneys to represent indigents. l40 
In New York and Los Angeles, indigents represented by the in­
dependent defender offices obtained outcomes equivalent to those of 
defendants who retained private counsel. In Washington, D.C., in­
digents with counsel appointed by the court fared worse than de­
138. STANDARDS RELATING TO PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES § 1.4 (Approved 
Draft 1968). 
139. Affidavit of John E. Ackermann (Oct. 6, 1977); through the affidavit, Mr. Ack­
ermann testified as an expert witness in the Noe case. At that time he was Dean of the 
National College of Criminal Defense Lawyers and Public Defenders at the Bates Col­
lege of Law, University of Houston. 
140. HERMAN, SINGLE, BOSTON, COUNSEL FOR THE POOR 5 (1977). 
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fendants with retained counsel. 141 While both the conflict-of-interest 
theory and its argument that it reaches a constitutional dimension 
were rejected by the court in Noe, it is certainly a factor to be consid­
ered in establishing a public defender system. 142 
Although any improvements in the indigent clients' perceptions 
of their appointed counsel would obviously be of great benefit, the 
question remains whether case outcomes can ever be equalized or 
whether the difference in outcome is an inherent obstacle when fac­
ing the system without the resources to fully exploit the safegaurds 
provided. Even if some disadvantages are inherent, they are not the 
sole factors causing the difference in outcome. The three aspects of 
the system discussed in this article are related and intertwined. De­
lays between arrest and initial court appearance can forever 
prejudice the indigent accused; pre-trial detention makes conviction 
and a prison term much more likely; those who suffer a delay be­
tween arrest and court appearance and those detained prior to trial 
are most likely to be represented by appointed counsel. Could things 
be equalized if independent defenders, appointed shortly after arrest, 
and had sufficient resources to fully prepare the case? Would release 
prior to trial serve as an equalizer in that it would enhance the attor­
ney / client relationship and give the accused an opportunity to de­
velop a favorable record on the outside while awaiting trial? Or, are 
indigent persons in our society simply more convictable and more 
imprisonable? Even assuming an affirmative, there are possiblities 
for reform which would minimize the discrepancies. Some of these 
are explored in the following section. 
V. 	 "LEGALIZING" THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM - WHO CAN 
MAKE THE REQUIRED CHANGES? 
The budget cuts implemented by the Reagan administration 
make it apparent that few, if any, federal dollars will be available to 
local communities in the near future for the purpose of revamping 
their criminal justice systems. While the constitutional rights of per­
141. /d. at 153-66. 
142. Judge Sharp, in Noe, concluded: 
In view of the impartial and neutral role played by the judge, it is difficult 
to imagine how the employment of pauper attorneys by the Court could be 
considered an "inherently compromising" situation. In any event, it is not a 
situation which case law holds to be constitutionally defective. 
468 F. Supp. at 53. But if. , People v. Barboza, 29 Cal. 3d 375,381,627 P.2d 188, 191, 173 
Cal. Rptr. 458, 461 (1981) (held that contracts between courts and public defenders 
presented inherent and irreconcilable conflicts of interests). 
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sons accused of a crime cannot be made contigent on the availability 
of funds, as a practical matter, cost does playa major role in deci­
sions relating to the functioning of public institutions. The criminal 
justice system is no exception. Fortunately, the reforms needed in 
most Indiana counties, for example, would not cause a substantial 
drain on public funds. In fact, reforms would probably result in a 
substantial savings to the local communities. 143 This is not, of 
course, intended to suggest that the needed reform should take place 
only if it is financially feasible or that financial savings should be the 
primary motive for reform. Because constitutional rights are at 
stake, the suggested reforms must take place. The fact that the re­
forms may actually result in substantial savings should simply pro­
vide an additional incentive to budget-conscious public officials. 
The purpose of this section is not to attempt to assess blame or 
fault for any shortcomings in our present criminal justice system. In­
stead, it represents a plea to public officials to scrutinize closely the 
system as it currently operates in their area and assess its strengths 
and weaknesses in light of what has been said in the preceding sec­
tions. If defects are identified, it is mandatory that corrective steps 
be taken. 
The most obvious vehicle for any of the suggested changes is the 
state legislature. For example, legislation mandating (1) an appear­
ance before a judicial officer promptly upon arrest in all cases; (2) 
the use of the least restrictive alternative for release pending trial; 
and (3) the prompt appointment of counsel for indigents, would help 
alleviate the problems. Such legislation would help fulfill the legis­
lature's obligations to keep state laws in conformity with constitu­
tional requirements and to safeguard the public treasury. Even if 
such legislation were passed, the responsibility for implementation 
would fall upon local officials. Absent a local commitment to com­
ply with the law, state statutes would simply represent a hollow· 
promise. Therefore, it is necessary to look primarily to local officials. 
Even without legislative change, all of the necessary changes 
can be made on the local level. As none of the shortcomings in the 
current system are mandated by statute, local officials are not pre­
143. For example, substantial savings would result from a reduction in the cost of 
housing inmates if more people were brought before a judicial official immediately upon 
arrest and released prior to trial. There would be less need for public defenders if people 
were released pending trial and employed (in public work programs if nothing else is 
available). The need for public defender services would be further diminished if funds 
used to pay bail could also be used to pay for an attorney and if there were fewer appeals 
challenging the competency of appointed counsel. 
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vented from making the needed changes. Since they, too, have an 
obligation to protect the rights of citizens, it is suggested that local 
officials must make the changes required by the Constitution and 
laws. Unquestionably, the courts must bear the primary responsibil­
ity for legalizing the criminal justice system. 
Several things could be done by local judges to protect the rights 
of indigents charged with a criminal offense. First, an order could be 
directed to the police officials responsible for operating the jails re­
quiring them to bring all detained persons before the court within a 
set time of their arrest, normally twenty-four hours. This could be 
easily facilitated by having one court in each county available, at a 
certain time each day, to consider such cases. Both the police and 
the prosecutor would be forced to demonstrate probable cause in 
cases in which an arrest was made without a warrant-a minimal 
burden since no lawful arrest can be made without probable cause. 
Second, at this initial appearance the court could determine whether 
or not appointed counsel was necessary,l44 thereby facilitating com­
petent representation. 145 At the same time it could consider release 
and require the state, through the prosecuting attorney, to make a 
showing of the necessity for conditions on the pre-trial release of the 
individuals detained. 
Third, regarding appointed counsel, state lawl46 places the bur­
den on the local courts to make appointed counsel available. Noth­
ing would prevent the local courts from contracting with an 
independent agency to provide such services. 147 The only role of the 
court then would be to determine whether the accused was indigent 
and, if so, the agency would be appointed to provide representation. 
The contractual agreement would assure the independence of the 
agency and include as part of its terms minimum standards relating 
to the defense function.l48 Fourth, the courts could establish pro­
grams designed to divert people from incarceration, both prior to 
trial and after conviction. 149 
Other local officials also have an obvious role to play in initiat­
ing and implementing changes in the system. Prosecutors, who have 
144. As indicated, this is required in Indiana by Nacotfv. State, 256 Ind. 97,102, 
267 N.E.2d 165,168 (1971). 
145. See supra notes liS, 116. 
146. Moore v. State, 401 N.E.2d 676, 678 (Ind. 1980). 
147. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 33-9-10-1 (West 1983), quoted supra note 107. 
148. See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, The Defense Function (Approved 
Draft 1968). 
149. See, e.g., NAT'L DISTRICT ArrORNEY'S ASS'N, A PROSECUTOR'S MANUAL ON 
SCREENING AND DIVERSIONARY PROGRAMS (1972). 
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an obligation to uphold the Constitution, must take steps to assure 
that the local procedures do not systematically infringe upon the 
rights of the accused. While they have an obvious interest in elimi­
nating any defects that can result in the reversal of otherwise valid 
convictions,lso their obligation goes beyond that. lsi At a minimum, 
prosecuting attorneys should be expected to cooperate with the court 
by being available for the early appearances before a judicial officer 
for determining probable cause, the need for conditions upon release 
and the appointment of counsel. 
The police responsible for pre-trial detention have a definite 
monetary interest in preventing delays between arrest and initial 
court appearance. This is true at least in part, because they are sub­
ject to false imprisonment actions, possibly resulting in damages 
which may be assessed against either the individual police or the 
general budget of the department. IS2 They are also fully aware of 
150. It has been held lhat defects in pretrial detention are not grounds for reversal 
of lhe conviction unless lhey result in improper confessions. Williams v. State, 264 Ind. 
664,678,348 N.E.2d 623, 632 (1976). Similarly, bail decisions are mooted upon convic­
tion and not a basis for challenging the conviction. Holguin v. State, 256 Ind. 371, 374, 
269 N.E.2d 159,160-61 (1971); Bozovichar v. State, 230 Ind. 358, 363, 103 N.E.2d 680,682 
(1952). Competency of counsel can be a factor on appeal of a conviction; however, as 
indicated earlier, it is difficult to obtain a reversal based on incompetency. See supra 
notes 99-100. 
151. It is an important function of the prosecutor to seek to reform and im­
prove the administration of criminal justice. When inadequacies or injustices in 
the substantive or procedural law come to the prosecutor's attention, he or she 
should stimulate efforts for remedial action. 
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Standard 3-1.4 (1980). The commentary to this 
standard is even more specific. 
As lhe public official in constant contact wilh the day-to-day administra­
tion of criminal justice, lhe prosecutor occupies a unique position to influence 
lhe improvement of the law. As one national study has noted, lhe prosecutor 
"affects lhe development of legal rules by his arguments in court. He can help 
bring about needed reform by pressing for changes in bail practices, for exam­
ple, or in procedures for the appointment of counsel." (footnote omitted). . . . 
It is in lhe public interest for the prosecutor to foster good working relationships 
with lhe defense bar, including defender agencies, and to participate in such 
activities as criminal law sections of lhe organized bar and joint seminars on 
criminal law and procedure. Reforms and improvements in lhe criminal law 
will more readily gain lhe approval of legislative bodies and lhe public if they 
are the joint work product of both prosecutors and defense lawyers. 
Id. See also, Standard 3-1.I(c). (''The duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice, not merely 
to convict.") 
152. Individual as well as governmental liability is contemplated by Indiana stat­
utes. See IND. CODE ANN. §§34-4-16.5-5, 34-4-16.7-1 (West 1983). Under recent 
Supreme Court decisions, local governmental entities can be liable for the actions of their 
employees and agents in civil rights cases filed under 42 U.S.c. § 1983 (1976). See Mo­
nell v. Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Owen v. City of Independence, 445 
U.S. 622 (1980). 
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the cost of pre-trial detention and should be expected to look for 
ways to reduce this cost through the release of inmates whenever 
possible. 
Finally, the public defenders appointed to represent indigent 
persons certainly have an ethical obligation to enforce all pre-trial 
rights of their clients. Their ability to protect these rights is en­
hanced significantly by an appointment promptly after arrest so they 
can insist upon an early court appearance for the accused and the 
appropriate individualized inquiry relating to pre-trial release. Re­
garding the effectiveness of appointed counsel, the individual attor­
neys have both an ethical obligation to provide competent 
representation and a financial interest in avoiding malpractice. ls3 
The potential agents for change on the local level are severa1. It 
is suggested that they, individually and collectively, have an obliga­
tion both to the community they represent and the persons charged 
with a crime to assure that the criminal justice system operates in a 
manner which protects the constitutional and statutory rights of all 
persons who come into contact with the system. Fair, equal treat­
ment cannot be contingent upon ability to pay. No responsible local 
official associated with the criminal justice system should tolerate 
practices or policies that in any way reduce the opportunity of an 
indigent person to obtain treatment comparable to that afforded to 
those with resources. A criminal justice system is acceptable only if 
it guarantees complete protection of the rights of those least able to 
protect themselves. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
It is not clear whether the availability of financial resources can 
ever be eliminated as an outcome determinative factor in the crimi­
nal justice system. What is clear, however, is that most communities 
in Indiana have not taken all reasonable steps to minimize the im­
pact and significance of the wide disparity in the resources available 
to criminal defendants. Until this is done, it is impossible to deter­
mine whether the difference - between those with and those with­
out resources - is inherent in the system. 
153. The Supreme Court recently held that a public defender is not subject to lia­
bility in suits by former clients under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) because "a public de­
fender does not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer's traditional 
functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding." Polk County v. Dodson, 
454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981). This, of course, does not eliminate "liability for malpractice in 
an appropriate case under state tort law." Id See also, Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193, 
201 (1979). 
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It is difficult to take issue with anyone who argues in favor of 
fairness and equity in the administration of our criminal justice sys­
tem. Inequities, whether real or perceived, can only detract from its 
credibility and legitimacy. Without these qualities the system is un­
dermined and generally ineffective. Nevertheless, pleas for fairness 
and equity often become controversial because they are blindly in­
terpreted as demands for more procedural protections for 
"criminals" that will further handicap law enforcement officials. 
We are not advocating more or fewer procedural safeguards; 
rather we are suggesting that those safeguards which do exist must 
be enforced and made equally available to everyone charged with a 
crime, regardless of wealth. Our Constitution and any minimal 
sense ofjustice can tolerate nothing less. The demonstrated discrep­
ancies between rules of law and local practices are intolerable. Such 
"official lawlessness" is always most devastating to those with the 
least power and influence - the poor. 
The irony of the situation is that very significant improvements 
in our system could be made with a minimal cost to society in terms 
of either dollars or protection. In fact, as shown, some of the needed 
changes would decrease cost and increase protection. Where there is 
a need for greater protection, it should be provided through laws and 
rules equally applicable to all. For example, if society is concerned 
about the number of crimes committed by persons released pending 
trial, this should be confronted by making the propensity to commit 
another crime a ground for denying release, not by increasing bail so 
only those with resources get released. Of course, there are many 
arguments opposing preventive detention. Those with money do not 
want freedom removed from the list of things that can be purchased. 
Those without money are concerned with the potential for discrimi­
natory application of preventive detention. The point is simply that 
responsible officials must address the merits of preventive detention 
as applied equally to all rather than imposing it upon some solely 
because of their lack of resources . 
. While, in the eyes of many, procedural protections are nothing 
more than devices for "coddling criminals," it is unlikely that any 
one would reject those protections ifconfronted with criminal prose­
cution. The presumption of innocence, pre-trial release, the right to 
counsel, checks on police practices, and other similar protections are 
extremely important and serve a critical function in our adversary 
system of justice. We ask only that those responsible for the opera­
tion of our system take the time to determine whether these protec­
tions are enforced and equally available to all. 
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APPENDIXA 

Mudd v. Busse: Study of the Effects of Pretrial 

Detention in Allen County, Indiana 

This study of pretrial detention in the Allen Circuit Court was 
undertaken to test the frequently expressed observation that accused 
persons detained during the pendency of their criminal proceedings 
are convicted more often, and, once convicted, are sentenced to 
prison more often than those released prior to disposition. l 
The sample population selected for study consists of 441 felony 
cases2 taken from the criminal causes which were filed in the Allen 
Circuit Court during 1974 and 1975 in which a final disposition was 
reached before November 22, 1976.3 The vast majority of the de­
fendants studied (96%) were charged with only one crime, and the 
most serious crimes charged were broken down as follows: 
Type of Crime Charged 
Crime No.4 % 
Armed Robbery 49 11 
First Degree Burglary 51 12 
Forgery and Uttering 40 9 
Second Degree Burglary 115 26 
Theft 95 22 
Other 91 21 
441 101%5 
1. The study was done under the direction of Dr. Eric W. Single, a senior research 
scientist with the Alcoholism and Drug Addiction Research Foundation in Toronto, Ca­
nada. Dr. Single has supervised and conducted many similar studies. See e.g. , Counsel 
for the Poor: Lawyer & Clients in Urban Criminal Courts (Lexington Press, 1977); The 
Unconstitutional Administration ofBail, 8 CRlM. L. BULL. 459 (1972). 
2. The term "case" is used to indicate a single criminal defendant. Thus, one crim­
inal cause may consist of several defendants or "cases." 
3. There were 510 cases filed in 1974 and 1975 which were disposed of by Novem­
ber 22, 1976. Of these, 69 (13.5%) were excluded from the study for the following rea­
sons: (a) all murder cases (16) and all cases in which the defendant was charged with 
either extradition (4) or being a fugitive (23); (b) all cases (11) which were venued in or 
out of the Circuit Court; (c) all cases (9) in which the court docket sheet could not be 
located; and (d) all cases (6) which were dismissed before the defendant ever made a 
court appearance. These cases were excluded primarily because bail was not set or be­
cause they would not accurately reflect the typical process of criminal justice in the Allen 
Circuit Court. Pending cases were not considered because they were missing one of the 
important elements of the study, i.e., case outcome. 
4. Refers to the number of cases in each category. 
5. Here, as in subsequent tables, totals of 99% of 101% are due to rounding to the 
nearest whole number for purposes of readability. 
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As the following table shows, the typical accused was male 
(95%), white (63%), young (71% under age 26), and had a prior crim­
inal record (58%): 
Demographic Portrait ofSample Population 






40 and older 
NA6 
(B) 	 Sex 
Male 
Female 





Prior Criminal Records 
(0) 
No Prior Convictions 





























6. uNA" means not ascertained. In the subsequent analysis, all cases where the 
particular variable under scrutiny was not ascertained have been excluded from that 
question. 
7. uINAP" means inapplicable. The 101 cases which are indicated as INAP are 
those where no presentence report was filed (defendants were either acquitted or had 
their case dismissed) and consequently, information concerning prior record was 
unavailable. 
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Of the 441 cases in the sample, only five were initially released 
on their own recognizance ("ROR")8 and another 13 obtained ROR 
following a motion to reduce. Thus, in 96% of all cases, money bail 
was the only available method of pretrial release. 
Bail was fixed in sums of $1000, $2,000, $5,000 or $10,000 in all 
but 3% of the sampled cases: 
Amount of Initial Bai" 
Amount No. % 
ROR 5 1 
$1,000 98 22 
$2,000 168 38 
$5,000 106 24 
$10,000 56 13 
Over $10,000 8 2 
441 100% 
The Allen Circuit Court followed the master bond schedule 77% of 
the time. Furthermore, codefendants in the study had bonds identi­
cal to their fellow codefendants 98% of the time. This data suggests 
that virtually no individual consideration is given to what amount of 
bail, if any, is initially appropriate in any case. 
Among those cases where pretrial status was ascertained (92% of 
all cases), over one-fourth (28%) never obtained their pretrial free­
dom, about one-fifth (22%) were never jailed and the remaining half 
(50%) spent some time in jail pending the outcome of their cases. At 
the time of disposition (e.g., dismissal, guilty plea), 41% of the sam­
ple were incarcerated, and 59% were released. 
As one might expect, there is an inverse relationship between 
the amount of bail and the likelihood that the accused can post the 
required security. In short, the higher the bail, the lower the percent­
age who made it: 
8. Ironically. in two of these cases the defendant was Jack Lee. the highest volume 
bondsman in Ft. Wayne. 
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Pretrial Status By Amount OfInitial Bail 
Amount No. Percentage 
Released 
ROR 5 100 
$1,000 92 86 
$2,000 149 81 
$5,000 97 66 
$10,000 61 36 
Most of the sampled cases were disposed of by either a guilty 
plea (70%) or a dismissal of the charges (19%). Only II% of the cases 
ever went to trial. About three-fourths of the accused (77%) were 
convicted; about one-fourth (23%) were not. The study data plainly 
shows a relationship between pretrial status and case outcome. As 
shown below, defendants who were in jail continuously between ar­
rest and final adjudication ("in") were more likely to be convicted 
than those who were free on bail during all ("out") or part ("part") 
of the proceeding: 


















Another way of looking at outcome is in terms of ultimate re­
sult. Thus, for much of the subsequent analysis three possible out­
comes are considered: 
(1) The accused is not convicted, ie., acquitted or, more 
commonly, obtains a dismissal of the charges; 
(2) The accused is convicted but avoids a prison term, e.g. , 
suspended sentence, probation, fine; and 
(3) The accused is convicted and sentenced to prison. 
The table below shows not only that detained persons are con­
victed more often than released persons (87% vs. 72%), but also that 
they are given prison sentences seven times as often as those who are 
never detained pretrial (70% vs. 10%): 
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Outcome By Pretrial Status 
In Part Out 
Not Convicted 13 25 28 
Conv., No Prison 17 34 62 
Conv., Prison 70 40 10 
100% 99% 100% 
(113) (201) (90) 
Thus, those who are never detained pretrial have one chance in 
ten of ultimately going to prison; in stark contrast, seven out of ten of 
those jailed full time receive prison sentences. 
Having demonstrated the stark discrepancy in case outcome be­
tween those who are detained and those who are released, the next 
inquiry must be whether there is any explanation for the discrepancy 
other than detention. What follows is the elaboration analysis of the 
relationship between pretrial status and outcome.9 Several factors 
are considered to determine whether they explain the apparent cor­
relation between detention and less favorable outcome: 
l. Type of Crime Charged 
2. Prior Criminal Record 
3. Type of Counsel 
4. Race 
5. Amount of Final Bail 
As the following analysis demonstrates, none of these factors, 
either individually or in combination, explains the disparity in out­
come between the detained and the released. This suggests deten­
tion itself causes a less favorable case outcome. 
1. Type oj Crime 
The discrepancy in case outcome between the detained and the 
released might be thought attributable to a difference in the type of 
crime charged between these two groups. Indeed, the circuit court's 
use of a bond schedule makes it more probable that one charged 
with a more serious crime will be detained. Further, it might be 
thought that independent of the bail determination, the person 
charged with a more serious crime will be more likely to be prose­
cuted vigorously, adjudged guilty, and given a heavy sentence. 
Not surprisingly then, the likelihood of an accused being de­
tained before disposition varies widely according to the type of crime 
9. See supra text accompanying note 45. 
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charged. As the table below shows,1O persons accused of armed rob­
bery and first degree burglary were more likely to be detained than 
those accused of theft and second degree burglary. 











































It is also generally true that those charges most likely to result in 
detention are also the most likely to result in conviction and a prison 
sentence. 
Outcome By Type 0/ Charge 
Armed 1st Degree 2nd Degree 
Robbery Burglary Forgery Thift Burglary Other 
Not 
Cony. 20 13 24 25 24 25 
Cony. 
No. 
Prison 36 45 43 42 36 
Cony. 
Prison 80 51 32 33 34 39 
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
(46) (47) (38) (89) (97) (87) 
Because there is a positive correlation between the type of crime 
charged and both the rate of detention and the likelihood of convic­
tion and a prison term, it might be hypothesized that the reason for 
the disparity in outcome between the detained and the released lies 
in the type of charge. The table below, however, disproves this hy­
pothesis because it shows that detained persons in any crime group 
were more likely to be convicted and vastly more likely to be sen­
tenced to prison than were the released people charged with the 
same crime. 
10. In this and subsequent tables, the 37 cases where pretrial status was not ascer­
tainable have been deleted from analysis. 
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Outcome hy Pretrial Status, 

Control/ingfor Type of Crime 

Not Convicted 
Cony. No Prison 
Cony. Prison 
Not Convicted 
. Conv., No Prison 
Cony. Prison 
Not Convicted 
Conv., No Prison 
Conv., Prison 
Not Convicted 
Conv., No Prison 
Conv., Prison 
Not Convicted 

























































II. In this and subsequent tables where there are less than ten cases, percentages 
are omitted and raw figures are presented in parentheses. 
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Other 
Not Convicted 18 26 32 
Conv., No Prison 4 42 54 
Conv., Prison 77 33 14 
99% 101% 100% 
(22) (43) (22) 
Consequently, the type of crime cannot explain the outcome dispar­
. ity between the detained and the released groups, since the disparity 
persists wit~ each crime category. 
2. Prior Criminal Record12 
Forty-one percent (41%) of those in the samplel3 had no prior 
criminal record; 19% had never been convicted of a felony, but did 
have a misdemeanor or juvenile record; and 39% had at least one 
prior felony conviction. As one might expect, persons with a crimi­
nal record were more likely to be detained than those without a 
record: 
Pretrial Status By Prior Criminal Record 
Record No Record 
In 33 28 
Part 57 37 
Out 10 34 
100% 99% 
(162) (116) 
It was imposible to determine whether defendants with a prior 
record were more likely to be convicted than those without a crimi­
nal record because the data on prior record was derived from 
presentence reports and thus it was available only for those con­
victed. However, for those convicted it was possible to determine the 
effect of prior record upon sentence, and not surprisingly, those with 
a record were twice as likely to receive a prison term: 
12. Prior criminal record here means having at least one of the following: a 
juvenile record, a misdemeanor conviction, or a felony conviction. 
13. The sample population for prior criminal record is 340 rather than 441. This 
smaller number is a result of the fact that information concerning prior criminal record 
was obtained from presentence reports, and the lOl cases in which the accused was not 
convicted could not be considered si,nce a presentence report on such individuals was 
never made. 
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Sentence By Prior Criminal Record 
Among those Convicted 
Record No Record 
Conv., No Prison 30 66 
Conv., Prison 70 34 
100% 100% 
(162) (116) 
Nonetheless, when detained persons are compared with released 
persons having comparable prior records (the factor of prior record 
being held constant), the disparity in sentence outcome between the 
detained and the released remains strong: 
Sentence By Pretrial Status, 
Control/ing For Prior Criminal Record 
Record No Record 
In Part Out In Part Out 


























This table shows that among persons with a prior record, detained 
persons are more that three times as likely to be sentenced to prison 
as are released persons. Moreover, among those defendants with no 
prior record, detainees are nine times as likely to receive a prison 
term. Indeed, detained persons without a prior record were sen­
tenced to prison almost three times as often (73% vs. 25%) as were 
those persons with prior record who were released. 14 
Because the detained received a much less favorable outcome 
than those who are released even when prior record is. taken into 
account, the factor of prior criminal record must be rejected as an 
14. The gross disparity persists even when one controls for only those with a prior 
felony record (at least one felony conviction): 
Sentence By Pretrial Status, 
Controlling For Prior Felony Record 
Felony Record No Felony Record 
In Part Out In Part Out 
Conv., No Prison 16 24 (6) 20 62 92 
Conv., Prison 84 76 (3) 80 38 8 
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
(37) (63) (9) (SO) (72) (47) 
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explanation for the different outcomes experienced by released and 
detained persons. 
3. Type of Counsel 
The third characteristic to be considered is the type of counsel, 
distinguishing between the defendant who employs his own attorney 
and the defendant with a court-appointed public defender. As the 
table below shows, there is a pronounced relationship between type 
of counsel and pretrial status. Defendants represented by public de­
fenders were far more likely to be detained than defendants repre­
sented by privately retained lawyers. 


















Similarly, there is an apparent correlation between the type of out­
come which an accused obtains and the type of counsel. 
Outcome By Type 01 Counsel 
Public Retained 
Defender Counsel 
Not Convicted 14 28 
Conv., No Prison 19 46 
Conv., Prison 66 26 
99% 100% 
(155) (249) 
Because there is a positive correlation between type of counsel 
and both the rate of detention and the likelihood of conviction and a 
prison term, it might be hypothesized that the reason for the dispar­
ity between the detained and the released lies in the type of attorney. 
Indeed, the statistics above support the commonly held assumption 
that defendants are worse off if they are appointed a public defender 
as opposed to retaining a private attorney. But the type of attorney 
does not explain the case outcome disparity between the detained 
and the released. Detained persons, regardless of the type of coun­
sel, were still more likely to receive an unfavorable case outcome 
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than were the released: IS 
Outcome By Pretrial Status 







In Part Out In ParI Out 
Not Convicted 



























Among those represented by the public defender, jailed defend­
ants were more likely to be convicted and imprisoned than those re­
leased. Among those with privately-retained counsel, the detained 
had a conviction rate approximately equal to the corresponding rate 
among the released but they were much more likely to receive a 
prison term if convicted (62% vs. 8%). Because the detained consist­
ently fared worse, the type of defense counsel does not explain the 
disparities in case outcome. 
4. Race 
It might be expected that one's race may affect both detention 
and case outcome and the data indeed shows that a greater percent­
age of non-whites were incarcerated pretrial than whites: 
Pretrial Status By Race 
White Black Hispanic 
In 22 37 50 
Part 50 51 33 
Out 28 12 17 
100% 100% 100% 
(253) (138) (12) 
Although race was not related to the rate of conviction, there 
was a strong correlation between race and whether one received a 
prison term - blacks were sent to prison far more often than were 
whites. 
15. These findings were confirmed in theNoe study. See infra Appendix B at 329. 
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Outcome By Race 
Not convicted 




















Because of the relationship of race to both the likelihood of de­
tention and the likelihood of unfavorable case outcome, it might be 
that the outcome disparity between the detained and released was 
attributable to race. However, when detained persons are compared 
with released persons of the same race, the disparity in outcome 
persists: 
Outcome By Pretrial Status, 
Controlling For Race 
Wltite 
In Part Out 
Not Convicted 16 19 30 
Conv., No Prison 20 42 63 
Cony., Prison 64 39 7 
100% 100% 100% 
(56) (127) (70) 
Black 
Not Convicted 10 34 18 
Conv., No Prison 12 21 59 
Conv., Prison 78 44 24 
100% 100% 100% 
(51) (70) (17) 
Hispanic 
Not Convicted (1) (3) 

Cony., No Prison (2) (2) 

Cony., Prison (3) (1) 

(6) (4) (2) 

Because the detained within each race category recieved worse case 
outcomes than did those who were released, race must be rejected as 
an explanation for the different outcomes experienced by released 
and detained persons. 
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5. Amount ofBail 
The amount of final bail is the last factor examined. The table 
below demonstrates what common sense would dictate: pretrial sta­
tus is related to the amount of bail; the higher the bail amount, the 
lower the percentage of people who make it: 
Pretrial Status By Amount OfFinal Bail 
ROR $2,000 or Less $2,000+ 
In 18 51 
Part 71 52 43 
Out 29 30 6 
100% 100% 100% 
(17) (253) (134) 
The amount of bail is also related to case outcome: 
Outcome By Amount OfFinal Bail 
ROR $2,000 or Less $2,000+ 
Not Convicted 47 22 19 
Conv., No Prison 41 44 19 
Conv., Prison 12 33 62 
100% 100% 100% 
(17) (253) (134) 
Because of the strong relationship between the amount of final 
bail and both the rate of detention and case outcome, it might be 
argued that the amount of bail explains the disparity in outcome be­
tween the detained and the released. If this theory were correct, one 
would expect to find an increasing likelihood of the accused's being 
detained, being convicted, and getting a prison term as the bail 
amount increases. But, as the table below shows, the disparity in 
outcome between the detained and the released persists even among 
groups of people upon whom substantially the same bail was im­
. posed. Regardless of the bail set, the released consistently received 
far fewer prison sentences than did the detained. 
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Outcome By Pretrial Status, 

Controlling For Amount OfFinal Bail 

(A) ROR In Part Out 
Not Convicted 42 (3) 
Conv., No Prison 42 (2) 
Cony. Prison 17 
101% 
(0) (12) (5) 
(B) $2,000 or Less 
Not Convicted 11 24 26 
Conv., No Prison 27 38 65 
Conv., Prison 62 37 9 
100% 99% 100% 
(45) (131) (77) 
(C) $2,000+ 
Not Convicted 15 24 (2) 
Conv., No Prison 10 24 (4) 
Conv., Prison 75 52 (2) 
100% 100% 
(68) (58) (8) 
The discrepancy in treatment between those detained and those re­
leased persists even when the amount of bail is controlled for and 
therefore the amount of bail does not explain the disparity in case 
outcome. 
6. Combination ofCharacteristics 
So far, it has been shown that no other single factor accounts for 
the disparate case outcomes experienced by detained and released 
persons, even though several of the factors discussed above - in­
cluding prior criminal record, type of counsel, and bail amount ­
are by themselves related to pretrial status and outcome. The final 
possibility is that these factors explain the disparity when considered 
in combination, even though taken alone they do not. 
This possibility is tested by holding constant several characteris­
tics at the same time. A characteristic associated with higher fre­
quencies of obtaining pretrial release and of receiving a favorable 
case outcome is called favorable. Earlier tables indicated that lack 
of a prior criminal record, a low bail amount, and a private attorney 
are favorable characteristics in this sense. Thus, a defendant classi­
fied as having three favorable characteristics is one who has no pre­
320 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:263 
vious record, a final bail of $2,000 or less, and a private attorney. A 
defendant with two favorable characteristics is one having two of the 
three, etc. 
Not suprisingly, there is a direct relationship between the 
number of favorable characteristics and pretrial status: 
Pretrial Status By Number 
OfFavorable Characteristics 
None One Two Three 
In 68 57 11 
Part 32 39 67 37 
Out 4 22 63 
100% 100% 100% 100% 
(40) (102) (114) (57) 
The table above shows that the number of favorable character­
istics a defendant had was closely related to his ability to obtain his 
pretrial release. Sixty-eight percent (68%) of the defendants who had 
no favorable characteristics remained in jail all of the time. This 
percentage steadily declines as the number of favorable characteris­
tics were detained all of the time. 
A similarly strong relationship was apparent for sentencing. 16 
Among those convicted, nine of ten defendants with no favorable 
characteristics ultimately received prison sentences, compared to 
only one in ten of the defendants with three favorable characteristics: 
Sentence By Number OfFavorable Characteristics 
None One Two Three 
Conv., No Prison 10 21 60 88 
Conv., Prison 90 79 40 12 
100% 100% 100% 100% . 
(40) (102) (114) (57) 
Because of the positive correlation between the number of 
favorable characteristics and both pretrial status and the avoidance 
of a prison sentence, it might be argued that the combination of 
characteristics considered explains this disparity in outcome between 
the detained and the released. However, the table below disproves 
this hypothesis because it shows that detained persons were sen­
16. It was not possible to relate the number of favorable characteristics to convic­
. tion because data on prior criminal record was only available for those defendants who 
were convicted. . 
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tenced far more frequently than released persons in the same 
category: 
Sentence By Pretrial Status, 


























































Consequently, even when highly relevant characteristics are consid­
ered in combination, they do not provide an explanation of the out­
come disparity between the detained and the released. The detained 
consistently fare worse. 
This study has shown that one factor - whether an accused is 
released or detained pending trial - substantially influences both 
the outcome of his case and the likelihood of his receiving a prison 
sentence. By examining the type of crime charged, prior criminal 
record, type of counsel, race, and the amount of bail, the study dem­
onstrates that neither independently nor in combination do any of 
these factors account for the disparity in case outcome between those 
detained and those released. This suggests that the fact of detention 
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itself has a direct and deleterious impact on the likelihood of convic­
tion and the likelihood of receiving a prison sentence. 
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APPENlJIX B 

Noe v. County ofLake: Study of the Pauper Counsel 

System in the Lake County Superior Court 

This study of criminal defense attorneys in Lake County, Indi­
ana was undertaken to test the frequently expressed observation that 
defendants represented by pauper attorneys fare worse than defend­
ants represented by private counsel and whether any disparity is due 
to the system within which attorneys work. 1 It is generally difficult 
to make such a determination because any disparity may be ex­
plained by the caliber of the attorneys rather than the system itself. 
However, because pauper counsel in Lake County are hired on a 
part-time basis, their performance as pauper counsel can be com­
pared directly with their performance in criminal cases when pri­
vately retained. 
The sample population selected for study consists of 1730 cases2 
taken from the criminal causes which were filed in the Lake County 
Superior Court, Criminal Division during 1975 and 1976 and in 
which a final disposition was reached before July 31, 1977.3 During 
this 31 month period, the pauper staff was appointed in 43% of the 
cases.4 A substantial period of time elapsed before indigent defend­
ants obtained the services of counsel. The average length of time 
from arrest to appointment was 12 days. In one-fourth of its cases 
(25%), pauper counsel was not appointed until at least 14 days after 
arrest, and in 8% of the cases over one full month elapsed before 
appointment. 
There were 19 attorneys who were employed as part-time pau­
per attorneys during the period studied. Of these, 14 also handled 
I. This study, like the Mudd study, was done under the direction of Dr. Eric W. 
Single. See Appendix A infra at 306 n.1. 
2. The term "case" is used to indicate a single criminal defendant. Thus, one crim­
inal cause may consist of several defendants or "cases." 
3. There were 2009 cases filed in 1975 and 1976 which were disposed of by July 31, 
1977. Of these, 279 (13.9%) were excluded from the study for the following reasons: 
(a) all cases (149) involving appeals from city courts; (b) all cases (19) in which the most 
serious crime charged was a misdemeanor; (c) all cases in which the defendant was 
charged with either extradition (16) or being a fugitive (62); and (d) miscellaneous (33), 
e.g., change of venue from the county, inability to locate docket sheet. These cases were 
excluded primarily because they would not accurately reflect the typical process of crimi­
nal justice in the Lake County Superior Court. Pending cases were excluded at the re­
quest of the clerk's office and because they were missing one of the important elements of 
the study, ie., case outcome. 
4. The type of representation at final disposition was proportionately identical to 
the initial representation, pauper counsel handling 42% of the cases. The type of repre­
sentation changed during the pendency of the proceeding in only 8% of the cases (134). 
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criminal cases before the same court in a private capacity. These 14 
attorneys handled 188 (20%) of the 920 cases handled by private 
attorneys. 
The sections below compare the results in cases where defend­
ants were represented by pauper attorneys with cases where defend­
ants were represented by private counseLs Although the primary 
comparison is between pauper and private attorneys, the tables also 
generally include a third category consisting of pauper attorneys act­
ing in a private capacity ("P-Private"). This was done so that a di­
rect comparison can be made between the results achieved by the 
same attorneys, the only difference being that in some cases they are 
employed by the judge rather than by their clients. 
The first hurdle in any study such as this is to identify criteria by 
which an attorney's performance can be measured objectively. This 
inquiry is, of course, limited by the raw data which is available. The 
information for this study was obtained from court docket sheets, 
and it was determined that three areas would be examined: 
(a) motions to reduce bail; 
(b) motions for change of venue from the judges; and 
(c) case outcome. 
The reasons for selecting these criteria are readily apparent. 
Case outcome, particularly the receipt of a prison term, is obviously 
the most important consideration to any criminal defendant. More­
over, as noted in the Mudd study, see supra Appendix A, because 
case outcome may be adversely affected by one's pretrial detention, 
motions to reduce bail are extremely important to defendants incar­
cerated prior to trial. Finally, a motion for a change of venue from 
the judge can also be important to a criminal defendant because 
judges can also be important to a criminal defendant because judges 
have highly divergent sentencing practices. 
A. Pretrial Status & Motions to Reduce Bail 
Slightly less than half of the sample population (45%) never ob­
tained their pretrial freedom ("in"); the remaining 55% were able to 
make bail at some point during the pendency of the proceedings 
("out").6 As one might expect, defendants with pauper attorneys 
5. Since the purpose of the study is to examine the performance of attorneys, the 89 
cases in which the defendant was not represented by counsel at final disposition are ex­
cluded from analysis. 
6. Pretrial status could not be ascertained in 37 cases (2%). The study excludes 
these 37 cases when pretrial status is considered. 
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were far more likely to be detained pretrial than those represented 
by private attorneys: 
Pretrial Status by Type ofAttorney 
Pauper Private 
In 70 22 
Out 30 78 
100% 100% 
(719) (891) 
With a significantly higher percentage of clients in jail, one 
would expect that pauper attorneys would file a greater number of 
motions to reduce bail. The evidence, however, shows that just the 
opposite occurs: pauper attorneys filed significantly fewer reduction 
motions. 
Private attorneys filed 383 motions to reduce bail while pauper 
attorneys filed only 140. As a percentage of their caseload, pauper 
counsel filed motions to reduce in 19% of their cases and private at­
torneys filed such motions in 42% of their cases. 
Pauper attorneys also filed reduction motions much later fol­
lowing arrest. Whereas private attorneys filed their motions to re­
duce on the average of 18 days following arrest, pauper attorneys did 
not file their motions until an average of 38 days had passed. As a 
result, indigents spend a longer time in jail before they even get a 
chance to have their initial bail reduced. 
Somewhat surprisingly, pauper attorneys were almost as suc­
cessful as private attorneys in having their motions to reduce 
granted. Whereas the court granted 88% of all reduction motions 
filed by private attorneys, it granted 75% of the pauper attorney mo­
tions. In view of this success, it is significant that pauper attorneys 
filed reduction motions in only 19% of their cases. 
B. Motionsjor Change of Venuefrom the Judge 
There are four full-time judges in the Lake Superior Court, 
Criminal Division, and, at times, other visiting or part-time judges 
sit as well. The sentencing practices among these judges differ 
widely. A convicted defendant's chances of being sentenced to 
prison are appreciably higher with Judges B and D than with the 
other judges:' 
7. One might suppose that the sentencing disparity among the judges is explained 
by the fact that Judges B and D handle a higher percentage of cases in which judges 
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Proportion lmprisioned Among Those Convicted-by 

Judge at Final Disposition 8 

Judge A Judge B Judge C Judge D Other 
No Prison 53 35 54 31 52.5 
Prison 47 65 46 69 47.5 
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
(194) (199) (313) (259) (59) 
Under Indiana law, at the time of the study, a criminal defend­
ant had an opportuni~y for an automatic change of venue from the 
judge originally assigned to his case.9 In view of the divergent sen­
tencing practice, this right to a change of judge was very important 
to the accused. 
One hundred ninety-nine motions for change of venue were 
filed in the sampled cases. The overwhelming majority of the mo­
tions (85%) were directed at the two judges who sentenced most 
harshly, Judges B and D: 
Presiding Judge at Time of Venue Motion 
No. % 
Judge A 25 13 
Judge B 126 63 
Judge C 4 2 
Judge D 44 22 
Other o o 
199 100% 
As with motions to reduce bail, private attorneys filed venue 
motions much more often than did pauper attorneys. Of the 199 
motions, pauper attorneys filed only 17 of them (8%) whereas private 
attorneys filed 182 (92%).10 As a percentage of their caseload, pau­
traditionally give prison terms, e.g., violent crimes as opposed to misdemeanors. If this 
theory were correct, one would expect to find a similar percentage of prison sentences 
among judges when one controls for the crime involved. But except for murder (where 
all convicted defendants were imprisoned), the disparity in sentencing practices among 
the judges continued even when the crime convicted is isolated and controlled, i.e., re­
gardless of the crime considered, Judges B and D sentenced defendants to prison more 
often than the other judges. Thus, the type of crime does not explain the disparity in 
sentencing practices. 
8. It should be here noted that disparity of sentencing by individual judges is not 
the focus of this study. The actual sentence received may be a product of many factors. 
Rather we are here addressing the performance of pauper counsel. 
9. See supra note 117 of article. 
10. Twelve of the 19 pauper attorneys never filed any venue motions. Of the 7 
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per attorneys filed venue motions in only 2% of their cases: 
Percenlage of Cases in Which Venue 
Molion Was Filed by Type ofAllorney 
N ofmlns N ofcases % oflolal 
Pauper 17 737 2% 
Private 182 909 20% 
In sharp contrast is the pauper attorneys' performance when 
acting in a private capacity. Whereas they filed venue motions in 
only 2% of their pauper cases, these same attorneys filed venue mo­
tions in 26% of their private cases - a rate noticeably higher than 
that of non-pauper, private attorneys: 
Percenlage of Cases In Which Venue 
Molion Was Filed By Type OfAllorney 
No ofmlns No ofcases % oflolaI 
Pauper 17 737 2% 
Pauper-Private 49 188 26% 
Other Private 133 732 18% 
As the following table shows, defendants with pauper attorneys 
were twice as likely as defendants with private counsel to have Judge 
B at final disposition: 
Final Judge by Final Allorney 
Pauper P-Privale Olher Privale TOlal 
Judge B 28 16 14 20 
Other Judges 72 84 86 80 
1000/0 100% 100% 100% 
(721) (188) (732) (1641) 
At final dispostion, 61% of the cases before Judge B were pauper 
cases. In contrast, only 40% of the cases before the other judges were 
pauper cases. 
The fact that pauper attorneys handled a disproportionate 
number of cases before Judge B had a disparate effect on their indi­
gent clients. This disparity can be explained only by pauper coun­
sel's systematic failure to file venue motions in their pauper cases. 
pauper attorneys who did file such motions, 12 of the 17 motions were filed by only two 
of the attorneys. 
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C. Case Outcome 
A criminal case can be disposed of in one of four ways: guilty 
plea, trial, dismissal, or diversion, e.g. , commitment to a state hospi­
tal. Most of the cases in the sample were disposed of either by a 
finding of guilty pursuant to a guilty plea (49%) or a dismissal of the 
charges after a plea of not guilty (33%). Seventeen percent (17%) of 
the cases went to trial and I % were diverted out of the criminal 
process. 
By type of attorney, the form of disposition was as follows: 
Form OfDisposition by Type ofAllomey 
Pauper P-Private All Private 
Guilty Plea 54 52 50 
Trial 20 15 16 
Dismissal 26 32 33 
Diversion 1 1 
101%11 99% 100% 
(721) (188) (920) 
The table above shows that overall the disposition by type of 
attorney was rather similar. Pauper attorneys were slightly more 
likely than private counsel to try a case (20% vs. 16%), whereas pri­
vate attorneys were more likely to have a case dismissed (33% vs. 
26%). While there was little difference in the rate of guilty pleas 
(54% vs. 50%), there was a significant disparity-between counsel as to 
the conviction rate following trial: 
Conviction Rate at Trial by Type ofAllomey 
Pauper P-Private All Private 
Convicted 70 59 49 
Acquitted12 30 41 51 
100% 100% 1000/0 
(142) (29) (151) 
A defendant's chance of conviction following trial were greater than 
two-to-one if represented by pauper counsel and an even one-to-one 
if represented by a private attorney. Thus, althol.lgh the rate ofgoing 
to trial was not that different, the success rate following trial was. 
II. Here, as in subsequent tables, totals of 99% or 10I % are due to rounding to the 
nearest whole number for purposes of readability. 
12. Acquittal here includes mistrials, hung juries, and not guilty by reason of 
insanity. 
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A more pragmatic way of looking at case outcome is in terms of 
ultimate result. Three possible outcomes are considered: 
(1) The accused is not convicted, ie., acquitted, or more 
commonly, obtains a dismissal of the charges; 
(2) The accused is convicted but avoids a prison term, e.g. , a 
suspended sentence, probation, fine; and, 
(3) The accused receives a prison term. 
The table below shows not only that defendants represented by 
pauper counsel are convicted more often than defendants repre­
sented by private attorneys (67% vs. 58%), but also that they are 
given prison sentences twice as often as those who retain their own 
attorneys (49% vs. 23%). 
Outcome by Type ofAttorney 
Not Cony. 




















Thus, those who employ their own attorneys have one chance in four 
of ultimately going to prison; in stark contrast, one of two defendants 
represented by the pauper staff receive prison sentences. 
Part of the disparity in case outcomes may be explained by pre­
trial status, ie., whether a defendant was able to make bail. Among 
those jailed pretrial, defendants with pauper attorneys were some­
whatOmore likely to be sentenced to prison than those with private 
attorneys (55% vs. 49%). Significantly, however, the disparity re­
mains constant among those who are not detained pretrial - indi­
gents with pauper attorneys are still twice as likely to receive a 
prison term as are defendants represented by private counsel: 
Outcome by Type ofAttorney Among 
Those Who Obtain Their Pretrial Release 
Pauper P-Private All Private 
Not Cony. 24 39 40 
Conv., No Prison 40 47 44 
Conv., Prison 36 14 16 
100% 100% 100% 
(200) (150) (707) 
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This study shows that there was a significant disparity between 
the performance of pauper attorneys and that of private counsel. 
Pauper attorneys filed fewer motions to reduce bail even though 
their clients were jailed prior to trial far more often. They also filed 
a significantly lesser number of motions for change of venue ftom 
the judge with the result that they handled a disproportionately high 
number of cases before a judge who imprisons defendants more 
often. Finally, defendants represented by pauper attorneys were 
more likely to be convicted and upon conviction, were imprisoned 
far more frequently than were defendants represented by private 
counsel. 
The study also showed that the difference between pauper and 
private cases cannot be ascribed to any general lack of ability of pau­
per attorneys. Pauper attorneys acting in a private capacity consist­
ently did as well, if not better than, other private attorneys. The 
difference must therefore be explained not by the abilities of the at­
torneys but instead by some part of the system of indigent represen­
tation which constrained pauper attorneys from pursuing their 
clients' interests fully and effectively. 
o 
